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The focus of the article is on the proper role of U.S. state governments in
regulating international business. The specific issue analyzed is the desirability
of having state attorneys general enforce federal antitrust laws in global
markets concurrently with federal antitrust regulators. Congress granted state
officials this power in 1976. In 2009, however, a large proportion of the world's
commerce is now conducted in international, rather than national markets. This
development has led Judge Richard A. Posner and others to advocate that the
states be stripped of their statutory power to enforce federal antitrust laws on
behalf of their residents as parens patriae. The argument has an initial appeal in
light of a long judicial inclination to see state involvement in either "interstate
commerce or "international affairs" as a threat to the ability of the United
States to formulate a coherent national economic policy. Thus, the issue forms
part of a larger question currently facing U.S. policy makers: How can the
United States best transform the hodgepodge of state and federal economic
regulation implemented during the New Deal into an effective regulatory regime
for the global markets of the 21st Century?
In taking on the controversial debate over the role of state attorneys general in
antitrust enforcement, the article draws upon recent legal and historical
'By Katherine Mason Jones, B.A., University of Georgia, M.A., University of Virginia,
J.D., University of Michigan, LL.M., London School of Economics & Political Science. Ms.
Jones is currently an Associate Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law. I
would like to thank Professors Peter Carstensen, John Dernbach, Michael Dimino, Anna
Hemingway, John Gedid, Juliette Moringello, Christopher Robinette, Sophie Smyth, and
William M. Wiecek for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Samuel
Farkas also provided useful comments and invaluable research assistance.
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scholarship on federalism to argue that globalization requires a paradigm
change in concepts of U.S. federalism. While many assume that increasing
international economic integration makes state participation in economic
regulation with international implications inherently problematic, the article
demonstrates that, to the contrary, states have an important role to play in the
regulation of international business. States have a long history of challenging
the federal government in a way that has promoted a robust national dialogue
on matters of public policy. In addition, states have historically played and
should continue to play a vital role in safeguarding the health, safety, and
welfare of the American public. Historical research reveals that the view of
state governments as protectors of the public interest formed an important part
of the Founders' vision. Globalization may suggest that states are not capable
of carrying out this function independently of the federal government. But the
fact that today's "local" threats to state residents now often spring from
international sources does not suggest that states should renounce their
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INTRODUCTION
Increasing economic competition in global markets raises novel issues
for lawmakers, as well as attorneys and scholars interested in antitrust
policy. The application of U.S. antitrust law to conduct occurring outside
its territorial boundaries has always been controversial. Similarly,
enforcement of U.S. antitrust law by state attorneys general has become
increasingly controversial as they have begun to play a larger role in the
international arena. Considered together, these two facts raise the question
of the proper role state antitrust enforcers should play in policing
287
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:285 (2010)
anticompetitive conduct in increasingly dynamic global markets.2
Consider a recent headline. On June 11, 2008 the American Antitrust
Institute ("AAI") held a press briefing on the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC") recently opened investigation into alleged
anticompetitive practices engaged in by Intel in the over $30 billion a year
global market for X86 computer chips.3 The situation came to light when
Intel's only competitor in this market, American Micro Devices ("AMD"),
filed a private law suit in U.S. court.4 Soon after, the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission began to investigate Intel's behavior and ultimately reached a
settlement with Intel with undisclosed terms. This was followed by an
investigation into the same allegations by the South Korean Fair Trade
Commission that resulted in a fine of $26 million against Intel in early June
of 2008.6 In 2007, the European Union also began an investigation into
Intel's conduct that resulted in a record-setting fine of $1.45 billion.' In
early 2008, the Attorney General of the State of New York instituted an
investigation of the allegations. Last to enter the fray was the U.S. federal
government when the FTC belatedly opened an investigation, issued
subpoenas in June of 2008,9 and filed suit on December 16, 2009.o In
addition to these governmental enforcement actions and the private lawsuit
by AMD, dozens of purchasers of X86 computer chips have filed class
actions against Intel in U.S. courts."
What is one to make of this apparently chaotic situation, which one
observer has referred to as "a three-dimensional chess match"? 2 In this
2 The issues addressed in this article form part of the larger question currently faced by
U.S. policy makers: How can the United States best transform the relatively random mix of
state and federal law governing most international industries and markets into an effective
regulatory regime for the 21st Century?
Telephone Conference Discussing Intel, American Antitrust Institute (June 11, 2008),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/intelealltranscript.ashx (follow the "Download the
Complete Transcript" hyperlink).
4 Laurie J. Flynn, A.MD. Suit Says Intel Bullied Clients, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 2005, at
C5.
5 Conference Discussing Intel, supra note 3.
6 id
7 See, e.g., James Kanter, Europe Fines Intel $1.45 Billion in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2009, at B8.
8 Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo Subpoenas Intel over Antitrust Accusations, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2008, at C3.
9 Editorial, The Intel Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, at WK 11.
10 Steve Lohn, F.TC. Says Intel Stiles Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at Bl.
1 The cases brought under federal law have been consolidated in Delaware, but there
were also dozens of consolidated class actions filed in California state court under
California's antitrust law. Intel 2008 Annual Report - Financial Statements - Notes to
Consolidated Financial Statements,
http://www.intc.com/intelAR2008/financial/statements/note24/index.html (last visited Aug.
10, 2009).
12 See Remarks of Albert Foer, Director of the American Antitrust Institute, Conference
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example, the parties claiming the right to investigate Intel's conduct
included a large multinational corporation filing suit as a private party, the
national antitrust authorities of three sovereign nations (Japan, South Korea,
and the United States), a regional arrangement of sovereign nations (the
European Union Commission), and a sub-national component (the State of
New York) of one of the sovereign nations (the United States) whose
national antitrust authorities ultimately opened their own investigation of
the conduct. Surely this many prosecutors are too many?
Surprisingly enough, upon close examination of the facts and legal
principles involved, the answer is no. When more than one enforcement
authority has jurisdiction to prosecute the same conduct, there is indeed the
potential for complexity and even conflict. Antitrust violations by
companies that operate globally raise complicated legal issues because the
United States has long claimed the right to enforce its antitrust laws
extraterritorially. 13 Today, other nations claim the same prerogative with
respect to their national competition law, or in the case of the EU,
supranational competition laws. 14 The situation is further complicated by
the fact that in 1976, Congress granted state attorneys general the authority
to enforce federal antitrust law in their capacity as guardians of the public
welfare of the residents of their states.15
The Intel example illustrates the application of different legal
standards to the same conduct, including different national antitrust statutes.
In the case of the U.S. involvement, it also illustrates what appears to have
been initially inconsistent exercises of prosecutorial discretion by the
federal government and the State of New York.16 Each nation investigating
Intel's conduct applied its own national law, while the European Union
Commission applied EU competition law.'7 That the United States claimed
the right to prosecute Intel under federal law by way of separate
investigations by the FTC and New York undoubtedly complicated an
already messy international situation.
Allowing multiple sovereign governmental units in the United States
to investigate potential antitrust violations in markets not confined to the
territory of the United States, however, benefits both U.S. consumers and
the consumers of other nations. Despite the plethora of government entities
Discussing Intel, supra note 3.
13 See United States v. ALCO, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
14 See generally Sarah Stevens, The Increased Aggression of the EC Commission in
Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Merger Regulation and its Impact on Transatlantic
Cooperation in Antitrust, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 263 (2002); II Hyung Jung, A
Comparative Study on the Question of Extraterritorial Application of the Competition Law,
18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 305 (2000).
15 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §18 (2000)).
16 See Confessore, supra note 8; Editorial, supra note 9.
17 Id; Conference Discussing Intel, supra note 3.
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potentially exercising jurisdiction over businesses operating in global
markets, the presence of overlapping state and federal authorities to
prosecute violations of federal antitrust law is not a problem that
complicates antitrust enforcement, but rather a situation that offers the
potential for more rational and effective enforcement. In fact, examination
of the history of concurrent state and federal enforcement of federal
antitrust statutes reveals the advantages of such redundancy and suggests
that the example of dual antitrust enforcement provides a model for
effective regulation in other areas of the law involving global markets.
When multiple sovereign governmental units investigate the same conduct,
U.S. consumers reap the benefits of a system that provides a higher level of
enforcement than a system that allocates the prosecutorial authority of the
United States to a single level of government. If wisely implemented, such
a system promotes both competition and innovation in global markets while
imposing few costs on legally compliant businesses.
The debate over the desirability of allowing states to prosecute conduct
in global markets that potentially violates federal antitrust law becomes
easier to resolve once it is recognized that much of the debate is
fundamentally intertwined with a larger debate about the nature of U.S.
federalism itself.'8 The view that allowing overlapping state and national
antitrust enforcement tends to chill private enterprise or lead to conflict is
based on the notion that in general, states and the federal government each
should operate in their "own territory" nearly exclusively. Under this view,
often referred to as "dual federalism," allowing areas of overlapping
jurisdiction is problematic because it creates undesirable conflict, and
further, is not consistent with fundamental principles of federalism.
Under a second view of federalism, however, allowing concurrent state
and federal enforcement of antitrust laws is preferable to exclusive national
enforcement because it leads to more effective antitrust enforcement with
few corresponding costs. This view makes an important contribution to the
debate because it recognizes three important issues that have not always
been taken into account by other theories. These three issues are: (1) the
historical and continued importance of the role of states in protecting the
public health, safety and welfare of their residents; (2) the danger of under-
enforcement in this area due to the enormous difficulty of detecting private
anticompetitive activity in global markets; and (3) the impossibility of
separating the truly national from the truly local in today's economic
environment. In addition, such enforcement allows state governments to
play a role in the U.S. constitutional order that arguably is more consistent
with fundamental principles of federalism than an approach that would
18 An examination of the history of concurrent enforcement of antitrust also sheds light
on the federalism debate. Arguments about federalism often tend to be highly abstract. The
debate over federalism in antitrust should supply a context that may illuminate the costs and
benefits of various policy choices.
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segregate regulated areas into those deemed most appropriate for either
state or federal control.
Americans have debated the desirability and even the constitutionality
of concurrent versus dualist views of state and federal jurisdiction since the
United States first came into existence. 19 At different times, each theory
has achieved ascendancy. In the late 1990s and early years of the 21st
century, this debate once again gained salience due in part to increasing
globalization. The inevitable increase in areas of overlapping jurisdiction
brought about by increasing economic integration of formerly national or
even local markets requires a return to this time-honored debate. An
understanding of the contours of the federalism debate is essential to a full
appreciation of the issues at stake in the antitrust enforcement debate.
Simply put, globalization requires a paradigm change in concepts of
U.S. federalism. While the language of the Constitution's Commerce
Clause has not changed, the real world of commerce has changed
immeasurably. In much the same way that the New Deal economic reforms
worked a major change in the allocation of responsibilities in our federal
system in response to changing economic conditions, the rise of the global
economy compels a similar endeavor if the United States is to safeguard the
health and welfare of its citizens in today's world. An important
consequence of globalization is that, today, the most pressing local issues in
any particular state are more likely to have global rather than truly local
origins. Thus the areas of greatest concern to state governments, i.e., those
issues most relevant to the states' constitutional responsibility to provide for
the health, safety, and welfare of their residents, are more and more often
areas over which the federal government has authority to regulate under its
commerce power. The relatively small and rapidly shrinking areas
considered to be of exclusively local concern threaten to make state
governments irrelevant if they are limited to addressing such purely local
matters. This result would be extremely unfortunate for U.S. consumers
because states were originally designated in the constitutional order as the
primary guardians of public health and welfare.
The contribution of this article to the debate on enforcement of the
federal antitrust laws is to apply legal scholarship on federalism to new
challenges posed to Congress and U.S. policymakers by the reality of
globalization and the transformation of national markets into world
markets. This article is divided into four parts. Part I outlines the debate
over the desirability of allowing states to enforce federal law concurrently
19 Other federal nations such as Australia, Canada, and Germany face their own unique
challenges and have dealt with these challenges in different ways. See, e.g. NICHOLAS
ARONEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF A FEDERAL COMMONWEALTH: THE MAKING AND MEANING
OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION (2009); Gerald Baier & Katherine Boothe, What is
Asymmetrical Federalism and Why Should Canadians Care?, in BRAVING THE NEW WORLD:
READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS (Thomas Michael Joseph Bateman, Roger Epp &
Richard M. Myers, eds., 4th ed. 2006).
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with national enforcement authorities in global markets. Part II sets forth
the two sides of the larger issue that forms a backdrop to the debate: the
debate over the nature of federalism itself and its "working processes."2 0
Part III analyzes the federal debate and concludes that theories of
federalism that are willing to accept large areas of overlapping state and
federal jurisdiction are both consistent with constitutional principles and
lead to better policy outcomes than do dualist theories when international
markets are involved. Part IV analyzes the arguments made in the
enforcement debate in light of insights provided by the debate over
federalism. It concludes that the primary advantage of concurrent
enforcement is a beneficial redundancy that increases the effectiveness of
the federal antitrust laws in deterring harmful anticompetitive conduct by
large corporations, a type of conduct notoriously difficult to police.
Enforcement authorities at one level of government may discover the
existence of covert anticompetitive activities that enforcement authorities at
a second level of government with different incentives might miss. In
addition, because the antitrust laws are subject to interpretation, dual public
enforcement encourages a beneficial dialogue between enforcement
authorities at different levels of government, the courts, and Congress
regarding which types of potentially-harmful commercial activities should
be deterred in order to protect the public interest.
I. TWO VIEWS OF OVERLAPPING ENFORCEMENT
The statutory scheme governing federal antitrust law in the United
States is unusual in the extent to which it relies on multiple means of
enforcement.21 In addition to the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and the FTC, fifty states and the District of Columbia are
authorized to enforce federal antitrust laws as parens patriae.22
Recognizing the difficulty of detecting anticompetitive private business
conduct, Congress also took the step of authorizing private individuals
injured by antitrust violations to sue for treble damages as "private
20 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 6-7 (2007).
21 See Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and
in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L. J. 1401, 1425 (2003) ("Antitrust Law is
unusual in the number of its potential enforcers, both American and foreign.").
22 Each state also has its own antitrust laws, which generally parallel federal law. See
Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the
United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 501, 506-07 (1994). The Antitrust
Divisions of the DOJ and the FTC have shared responsibility for government enforcement of
the federal antitrust laws for decades. Id. at 504-05. The position of Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust was created in 1903, and the Antitrust Division became a separate
operating unit within the DOJ thirty years later. Id. Congress separately created the FTC in
1914, in part specifically to supplement the DOJ's enforcement of the antitrust laws. Id.
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attorneys general."23 As one U.S. antitrust authority has noted:
Antitrust enforcement today involves two federal antitrust agencies,
multiple regulatory agencies, fifty states, countless private plaintiffs,
and the common law, which has developed through multiple levels
of courts. If you were sitting down to construct an antitrust
enforcement system today, it is likely that you would not create a
system that looked like this.24
This statement refers only to the parties authorized to enforce U.S. antitrust
laws. In addition to the United States, approximately 100 countries have
now enacted their own competition laws, which they have been enforcing
internationally much more aggressively than in the past.2 5
The role of state attorneys general in enforcing antitrust law is
multifaceted. In addition to enforcing their state's antitrust statute, state
attorneys general are able to enforce federal antitrust law under a variety of
circumstances.2 6 The subject of this article is the statutory parens patriae
authority Congress granted to state attorneys general to sue for treble
damages on behalf of "natural persons" residing in the state who have
suffered antitrust injury.27 "Parens patriae" translates literally into "parent
of the country." 28 The term "refers to a state's role as guardian and its
sovereign right to protect its citizens." 2 9  The issue of the propriety or
desirability of this statutory parens patriae authority gained renewed
salience in the 1980s when an increase in the enforcement activities of state
23 Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2002)).
24 Deborah Garza, Remarks on the Progress of the Antitrust Modernization Commission:
Remarks at the Milton Handler Antitrust Review, November 29, 2006, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 261, 273. Garza is Chair of the Antitrust Modernization Commission. Interview with
Antitrust Modernization Commission Chair Deborah A. Garza, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE,
Apr. 2007, available at www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/04/AprO7-
Garzalntrvw4=30f.pdf.
25 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization ofAntitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U.
L. REV. 343 (1997) (describing the spread of antitrust law and its international enforcement).
26 State officials may sue as private plaintiffs under federal antitrust law if the state itself
or one of its political subdivisions is injured. In some circumstances, states may sue to
enjoin conduct that injures or threatens the states' economy or its consumers under the
states' common law parens patriae capacity. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1995); see also Hawaii v.
Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972).
27 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, supra note 15.
28 Sara Zdeb, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens
Patriae Standing for State Global Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEo L.J. 1059, 1068 (2008).
29 Id. ("Parens patriae originated as an English common law doctrine which allowed the
Crown to assert the rights of subjects who were incapacitated, such as children or the
mentally ill, or who lacked a legally cognizable injury.") American courts later adopted the
English doctrine and expanded its application. Id. Under the U.S. version of the doctrine,
states were permitted to sue not only on behalf of helpless individuals, but also to protect the
general health and welfare of their citizens. Id.
293
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:285 (2010)
attorneys general, particularly in response to conduct occurring in global
markets, led to calls for Congress to eliminate this authority either
completely or in the alternative, restrict its use to instances involving
primarily local conduct.30
A. Historical Background: The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976
State legislatures were quicker to pass laws in response to perceived
threats from the economic power of large corporate entities in the mid-
31
nineteenth century than was Congress. When Congress entered the field
in 1890 by passing the Sherman Act, it did so with intent to supplement,
rather than replace, preexisting state law.3 2 Thus the states and the federal
government have shared the task of antitrust enforcement from its
inception. In 1976, Congress enlarged the state role in antitrust
enforcement when it granted state attorneys general the right to enforce
federal antitrust law when antitrust violations injured their residents.34 That
Congress possessed the power to do this under the Commerce Clause was
uncontroversial because the Supreme Court has held that Congress is free to
delegate or "share" its power to regulate interstate commerce with state
governments if it so desires.35  The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act ("H-S-R Act") not only authorized state attorneys
30 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925
(2001) (discussing antitrust law and federalism) [hereinafter Posner, New Economy];
Michael DeBow, State Antitrust Enforcement: Empirical Evidence and a Modest Reform
Proposal, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 267, 280-82 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2004) (discussing
antitrust law, federalism, and merger enforcement). The analysis here is limited to the policy
implications of concurrent state and federal authority to investigate and prosecute
anticompetitive conspiracies or attempts to monopolize markets. Id. It does not deal with
merger enforcement, which is a unique type of antitrust regulation that raises issues that have
little in common with enforcement of restrictions on anticompetitive conduct. Id.
31 See Stephen Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 FLORIDA L. REv 653,
657-61 (1974).
32 See Id. at 660-61.
It was assumed initially that state antitrust laws were essential because Congress had
no power to regulate purely local activities. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437
U.S. 117, 130 (1978); ARC Am. Corp. 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (holding state antitrust laws
to be within "an area traditionally regulated by the states" for which there is a "presumption
against preemption"). Changes in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause in the wake of the Depression of the 1930s altered this assumption, however. See,
e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
34 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, supra note 15 at § 301. In the
same year, Congress encouraged state govermments to beef up enforcement of state antitrust
statutes when it enacted the Crime Control Act of 1976, which provided seed money to states
to be used for this purpose. Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, 90 Stat. 2407
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C. and repealed in part).
3 See Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 431, 434, 436-38 (1946).
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general to bring suits on behalf of their injured residents, it also directed the
DOJ to share with state officials information the DOJ had collected in its
antitrust investigations.
Title III of the Act granted to state attorneys general the right to sue for
treble damages for injury sustained to the property of "natural persons," as
opposed to business entities, resident in their states. The legislative
history of the Act explains the reasons that Congress took this step. 3 8 The
House Judiciary Committee reported that Congress desired "to provide a
new federal antitrust remedy" to state residents injured by violations of the
antitrust laws" for three reasons: "to compensate the victims of antitrust
offenses who might otherwise go uncompensated; to prevent antitrust
violators from being unjustly enriched; and to deter future antitrust
violations."3 9
Of special concern was providing a remedy to individual consumers
injured by price-fixing conspiracies involving multiple small transactions in
essential commodities such as food or medicine.40 While business entities
injured by such conspiracies had both the economic incentive and the
ability to sue for redress under existing law, the same was not true of
injured consumers who often lacked the incentive to sue for damages due to
the small size of their losses. 4 1 The House Report also noted the particular
problems involved with bringing class actions in this area,42 as did the
Senate Report on the legislation. The Senate Report stated, "consumers
have found little relief under the class action provisions of the Federal
Rules because of restrictive judicial interpretations of the notice and
manageability provisions of Rule 23 and practical problems in the proof of
individual consumers' damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.A3
Indeed, one Court of Appeals judge noted that the purpose of the grant of
statutory parens patriae authority to state attorneys general was "to
overcome obstacles to private class actions through enabling state attorneys
general to function more efficiently as consumer advocates."" Granting
state attorneys general the right to sue on such consumers' behalf, it pointed
out, would not unfairly increase any defendant's liability, but rather would
make an additional method of enforcement available to persons suffering
36 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, supra note 15, § 301.
SId.
38 H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I) (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-499(11) (1975).
39 H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I) pt. I at 2572.
40 H.R. REP. No. 94-499(1) pt. 3 & pt. 4.
41 H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I), pt. 3.
42 H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I), pt. 5 subsection 4C(b).
43 See generally, S. REP. No. 94-803, pt. 1, at 6 (1976).
4 New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 48 (2d. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, 665 F.2d 24, 35 (2d. Cir. 1981). Connecticut v. Cuisinarts,
Inc. 460 U.S. 1068 (1983)).
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actual antitrust harm who would otherwise go uncompensated.45 The report
noted,
A state attorney general is an effective and ideal spokesman for the
public in antitrust cases, because a primary duty of the state is to
protect the health and welfare of its citizens. He is normally an
elected, accountable and reS onsible public officer whose duty is to
promote the public interest.
The legislation was expected to have other benefits as well. "An
extremely important benefit" of the legislation, noted the Report, was the
"promotion of cooperation in antitrust enforcement between the states and
the federal government." 4 7 An additional reason given for empowering
state attorneys general in this way was that state attorneys general have
48
traditionally represented the "proprietary" interests of the state.
According to the Report, "When the state itself is the victim of
anticompetitive restraints, an attorney general can recover treble damages
on behalf of the state as a purchaser of goods and services. Attorneys
general also can act as a group representative of entities at other levels of
government.'1 9
As noted above, in the years after passage of the H-S-R Act, two
trends coalesced to call into question the wisdom of allowing state
enforcement of federal antitrust law. One development was an increase in
the number and types of competitive activities previously considered to be
antitrust violations that the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
declined to prosecute and a corresponding increase in the number of
antitrust cases brought by state officials.50 In order to tackle complex
antitrust cases for which states had limited resources, the National
Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") formed the Multistate
Antitrust Task Force in 1983.51 Representing all the states, plus the U.S.
territories and the District of Columbia, the NAAG Antitrust Task Force
now represents all the states, plus the U.S. territories and the District of
Columbia and assists in coordinating investigation, litigation, lobbying, and
training tasks.52
45 H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I) pt. 4.
46 H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I) pt. 3.
47 id
4' H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I) pt. 5 § 4F.
49 See H.R. Rep. 94-499(1) pt. IV (1975).
50 See Jay L. Himes, Chief of Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney Gen. of N.Y.,
Remarks Presented to Antitrust, Competition and Trade Committee of LEX MUNDI:
Federal "Unemption" of State Antitrust Enforcement (May 14, 2004).
51 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2008).
52 Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1004, 1014 (2001).
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The second development was the increasing economic importance of
anticompetitive business practices, such as those involved in the Intel
situation, occurring in global markets that threatened injury to purchasers in
widely dispersed geographic areas. In the Intel case, for example, Intel was
the dominant manufacturer of an important computer chip that it sold
throughout the world.5 3 In 2001, the Microsoft case5 4 greatly increased the
profile of state attorneys general in international commerce when a number
of states that had filed suit against Microsoft refused to aFree to a remedy
proposal favored by both the DOJ and Microsoft officials.'
B. Restrictive Views of State Authority
Those who see the complications arising out of dual enforcement as an
increasingly intractable problem have proposed two different but closely-
related solutions. Both are motivated by a desire to limit the antitrust
enforcement activities of state attorneys general to conduct occurring
primarily within the borders of their states. These two solutions are to
eliminate states' statutory parens patriae authority completely or to restrict
its use to situations involving only local competitive issues rather than
issues that have a detrimental effect on competition in national or
international markets.
1. Posner's Position: Eliminate Statutory State Parens Patriae Authority
The first solution, most prominently endorsed by Judge Richard A.
Posner, is for Congress to reverse the grant of parens patriae power to the
states it made in 1976. Eliminating this authority, he argues, would avoid
the potential for state enforcement actions to complicate and possibly
duplicate federal antitrust enforcement actions. Posner describes the
problem this way:
No sooner does the Antitrust Division bring a case, but the states,
and now the European Union, are likely to join the fray, followed at
a distance by the antitrust plaintiffs' class action bar. The effect is to
lengthen the original lawsuit, complicate settlement, magnify and
protract the uncertainty engendered by the litigation and increase
litigation costs.58
53 See Flynn, supra note 4.
54 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (2003).
5 Paul Davidson, States Split on Accepting Microsoft Ruling, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2001,
at 3B.
56 See Posner, New Economy, supra note 30, at 940. See also McChesney, supra note 21
at 1424-31; Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 877 (2003).
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He contends that such state action chills private enterprise and interferes
with the national government's right to set policy on matters with national
and international implications.59 Posner would thus leave enforcement of
federal antitrust laws to the efforts of private plaintiffs and national antitrust
enforcement authorities, such as the DOJ and the FTC.o
Posner believes that it is desirable for state officials to have authority
to bring antitrust suits, federal or state, only "under circumstances in which
a private firm would be able to sue, as where the state is suing firms that are
fixing the prices of goods or services that they sell to the state."' Posner's
goal is to prevent com anies from being subject to multiple remedies for
the same misconduct. The case against permitting states to bring
enforcement actions under either state or federal law is even greater, he
argues, in the case of international transactions.63 Posner offers no detailed
explanation for why he believes the case to be stronger in international
transactions. Others have noted, however, that state regulation of conduct
and actors doing business in international markets tends to raise a general
59 See Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State
Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 5, 8-13 (2004) [hereinafter Posner,
Federalism]; Posner, New Economy, supra note 30, at 939. See also DeBow, supra note 30;
Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557 (2000); Robert W.
Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, Federalism in Antitrust, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 877, 879-
80 (2003).
60 See Posner, Federalism, supra note 59, at 12-14 (proposing that states not be allowed
to apply antitrust law to interstate or foreign commerce); Posner, New Economy, supra note
30.
61 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 281 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Posner,
ANTITRUST LAW]. Alternatively, Posner has proposed giving the federal authorities "a right
of first refusal" with respect to antitrust suits. Id. at 282. Under this proposal, state antitrust
suits would be preempted if a federal suit were filed involving the same conduct. See
Posner, New Economy, supra note 30, at 940. Posner would eliminate state parens patriae
enforcement of federal law but does not go so far as to argue for the preemption of all state
antitrust laws. Posner argues there is a stronger case under principles of federalism for
allowing this type of enforcement since individual plaintiffs can sue under state antitrust law,
as well as state officials such as the state attorney general. Posner supports a limited role for
state antitrust laws because he argues that if antitrust violations that did not affect interstate
or foreign commerce were not actionable under state law, there would be a law enforcement
vacuum because the Commerce Clause does not authorize federal action against such
violations. But he would limit its applicability to cases involving only "local" activities and
effects. See Posner, Federalism, supra note 59, at 8-13.
62 See Posner, Federalism, supra note 59. This concern has also been expressed by
others. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Comments Regarding
Government Enforcement Institutions: The Enforcement Role of the States with Respect to
Federal Antitrust Laws in Civil Nonmerger Cases 6 (Oct. 19, 2005), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/publicstudiesfr28902/enforcement pdf/051019_ABA_
StateCivil Nonmerger-Enf Inst.pdf [hereinafter ABA Comments]; ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 196-97 (Apr. 2007),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/reportrecommendation/chapter2.pdf
[hereinafter AMC REPORT].
63 See Posner, Federalism, supra note 59, at 13.
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concern arising from the idea that the United States should speak with one
voice in matters involving foreign affairs, and that voice should be the voice
of the national government, not that of a single state or group of states.64
Posner cites three reasons for eliminating state antitrust jurisdiction.
First, "[s]tates do not have the resources to do more than free ride on federal
antitrust litigation, complicating its resolution. . . ."65 This lack of resources
is presumably the reason for his second objection, which is the generally
poor legal abilities of lawyers in the attorneys general office of most
66
states. Here, Posner's view is based on personal experience. He relates
that:
When I was a law clerk at the Supreme Court, almost forty years
ago, I was struck by the poor quality of the briefs and arguments of
the lawyers in the offices of the state attorneys general. Since
becoming a judge almost twenty years ago, I have been struck by the
poor quality of the briefs and arguments of most, though not all, of
the la wers in the offices of the state attorneys general of my
circuit.
He attributes this low level of competence to the low salaries paid to state
officials.
Posner's third objection to state enforcement is that state officials are:
too subject to influence by particular interest groups that may
represent a potential antitrust defendant's competitors. This is a
particular concern when the defendant is located in one state and one
of its competitors is in another, and the competitor, who is pressing
his state's attorney general to bring suit, is a major political force in
that state."
According to Posner, "A situation in which the benefits of government
action are concentrated in one state and the costs in other states is a recipe
for irresponsible state action. 70 Posner sees this phenomenon as a
6 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understanding ofForeign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999).
65 See Posner, New Economy, supra note 30, at 940.6 6 Id at 941.
67 Id.
68 Id.
6 9 Id. at 940-41.
70 Posner, New Economy, supra note 30, at 941. This concern has been raised by others.
See, e.g., Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 56, at 79; Comments of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States on Commission Issues Accepted for Study 3,
Memorandum from the Antitrust Modernization Commission Staff to AMC Commissioners
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"genuine downside of federalism." 71 For the proposition that the federal
government is less subject to pressure from special interests, he cites James
Madison's argument regarding the benefits of a large republic, which is set
forth in Federalist No. 10.72 He does not assert that federal agencies are
free from such special interest pressure, but believes it is only to a small
degree because most lawyers at federal agencies aspire "[t]o land good
berths in the private practice of law" which requires them to "demonstrate
their professionalism." 73
Posner asserts that statutory parens patriae authority has
disadvantages not only because states are more subject to political pressure
than the federal government, but also because "state attorneys general are
not the states."74 He contends that state attorney generals have detrimental
incentives to seek to maximize the political benefits of their actions and
minimize their cost by "free-riding" on suits originally instituted by federal
authorities. 75 Another disadvantage of state attorney general participation
in such lawsuits is the possibility that they will complicate any settlement
efforts, or that they will attempt to channel the funds they recover on behalf
of their residents into charitable uses that advance their political agendas.7 6
Posner concedes that "[i]n principle, by offering competition in public
enforcement of federal antitrust laws to the U.S. Department of Justice, the
state attorneys general keep the Department on its toes . . . . He
discounts the value of such competition, however, by noting that the
overlapping jurisdiction of the DOJ and FTC generates competition in the
enforcement of U.S. federal antitrust law and by observing that,
"increasingly, there is competition at the international level as well."78 In
addition, he argues that resource constraints make it "unlikely that state
attorneys general will be sources of innovative antitrust doctrines or
methods of proof . ...
Posner asserts that any new doctrines resulting from state enforcement
are of limited value because state attorneys general can only offer a more
restrictive interpretation of the federal antitrust laws than federal
71 Posner, New Economy, supra note 30, at 941.
72 Id. "The federal government, having a larger and more diverse constituency, is, as
James Madison recognized in arguing for the benefits of a large republic, less subject to
takeover by a faction. I am not myself inclined to make a fetish of federalism." (taking his
argument from THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)).
7 See Posner, New Economy, supra note 30, at 942.
74 See Posner, Federalism, supra note 59, at 8.
75 Id. at 9.
76 Id at 10.
n7 Id. As Posner puts it, "The effect of the [Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements]
Act, in principle at least, is to make public enforcement of federal antitrust law a competitive
rather than a monopoly 'market."' Id. at 8.
78 Id. at 11.
7 Id. at 10.
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enforcement authorities.80  This fact raises the danger that interstate
businesses will be forced to conform their business practices to the most
restrictive state interpretation of federal antitrust law. A third reason that
Posner argues state parens patriae actions are unnecessary is that injured
private parties can seek redress through class action suits.82 Based on all of
his arguments against state parens patriae actions, Posner would prefer that
national authorities alone be allowed to operate in national and especially
international markets.83
2. The AMC's Recommendation: Congress Should Limit But Not
Eliminate State Parens Patriae Authority
There are those who would not go so far as to eliminate state parens
patriae authority but instead propose that such authority be exercised only
in limited situations. This was the recommendation of the Antitrust
Modernization Commission ("AMC") and others.84 The AMC is a
bipartisan commission established by Congress in 2002 to study issues
arising from the globalization of commerce, including the issue of
concurrent state and federal antitrust enforcement. In 2006, the
Commission recommended in its Final Report that state attorneys general
continue to possess parens patriae authority, but that such authority should
be limited to the prosecution of local matters.86 This solution is intended to
allow the federal government to play the primary role in setting national
antitrust policy and to allow the nation to speak with one voice in its foreign
affairs.87
80 See Posner, Federalism, supra note 59.
81 Id.
82 id
" Id. at 13.
84 See AMC REPORT, supra note 63; see also DeBow, supra note 30, at 279-81; Hearings
on the Allocation of Antitrust Enforcement Between the States and the Federal Government
Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission (Oct. 26, 2005) (statement of Phillip A.
Proger, Attorney, Jones Day), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission hearings/pdflStatement-Proger.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of Phillip A. Proger].
85 Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §11051-
11060, 116 Stat. 1856 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1). This act tasked the AMC with four
objectives: "(1) to examine whether the need exists to modernize the antitrust laws and to
identify and study related issues; (2) to solicit views of all parties concerned with the
operation of the antitrust laws; (3) to evaluate the advisability of proposals and current
arrangements with respect to issues so identified; and (4) to prepare and submit to Congress
and the President a report. . ." Id. § 11053. The Act required that the AMC have twelve
members, with four appointed by the President, two by the majority leader of the Senate, two
by the minority leader of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and two by the minority leader of the House of Representatives. Id. § 11054.
86 AMC REPORT, supra note 62, at 196-97.
87 See id. at 216.
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The AMC declined to recommend that state parens patriae authority
be eliminated altogether because it concluded that on balance, the benefits
of state enforcement outweighed its costs.18 Nevertheless, it recommended
that as a policy matter, states should focus their enforcement efforts
"primarily on matters involving localized conduct or competitive effects,"
and leave conduct with national and international competitive effects to the
national enforcement authorities." The rationale for this division of labor
was that state authorities often possess advantages in discovering and
prosecuting locally-based anticompetitive conduct, and that "a state focus
on local or regional matters can avoid unnecessary overlaps in state and
federal antitrust enforcement, thereby using limited enforcement resources
more efficiently." 90 The AMC noted that "for matters of national or
international scope that also have local competitive effects, it seems most
appropriate for states to investigate competitive conditions in their own
local markets."91
C. Expansive Views of Concurrent Enforcement
1. Congress Should Retain State Parens Patriae Authority
Critics of the proposals to limit or eliminate states' parens patriae
enforcement authority see overlapping state and federal authority to enforce
federal antitrust law not as a problem but as a success. 92 They point out that
eliminating this authority does nothing to solve the problems that concerned
Congress when it enacted legislation granting states this authority.93 One of
these concerns was that no general federal authority exists to obtain
damages on behalf of injured individuals, and that state parens patriae
8 See id. at 192-203.
89 See AMC REPORT, supra note 62, at 187, 194. The Final Report did not recommend a
procedure for implementing this recommendation. Presumably a mechanism could be set up
to coordinate the investigative activities of state attorneys general and national authorities
that would operate in a similar fashion as the current "clearance procedure" used to
coordinate the investigative activities of the DOJ and FTC to avoid overlapping
investigations of the same alleged anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 132-37.
90 Id. at 197.
91 Id; see also JOHN J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 239-42
(1964) (advocating using economic impact to allocate antitrust responsibility between state
and federal authorities).
92 See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement,
53 DUKE L.J. 673 (2003); Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres
Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 361 (1999); First, supra note 52.
9 See Jay L. Himes, Chief Antitrust Bureau Office of the Attorney General of the State
of New York, Federal "Unemption" of State Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Presented to
the Antitrust, Competition and Trade Committee of Lex Mundi (May 14, 2004). For a
discussion of the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act,
see Part I.A. of this article.
302
Federalism and Concurrent Jurisdiction
30:285 (2010)
authority helps fill this gap. 94 These proponents of state parens patriae
authority also assert that injured individuals have benefited from state
officials developing innovative methods for distributing settlement proceeds
developed by state officials.95 In response to the argument that class action
suits could be substituted for parens patriae actions, they note that the latter
96
offer a number of advantages over private class actions.
Proponents of state parens patriae authority are untroubled by the
existence of overlapping jurisdiction to prosecute the same conduct; a
situation, they point out, that is commonplace in much of criminal law. In
their view, the federal design of the Constitution sets up a system with
many areas of concurrent state and federal regulatory authority, suggesting
there is no need to separate jurisdiction over interstate and intrastate
commerce.97  Overlapping jurisdiction, they argue, stimulates competition
in antitrust enforcement and results in better public policy outcomes.98
Finally, they argue that the history of state parens patriae actions
demonstrates its many advantages and that opponents' claims of state
parochialism or favoritism toward in-state interests are overstated.99
Not surprisingly, many of the most vocal opponents of limiting parens
patriae authority of state attorneys general have been state attorneys general
themselves and their staffs. 00 They argue that litigation brought on. behalf
94 Unlike the states, neither the DOJ nor the FTC has the power to recover damages on
behalf of consumers injured by antitrust violations. The FTC has claimed the right to seek
the equitable remedy of disgorgement, but has used that remedy sparingly.
95 Statement of Phillip A. Proger, supra note 84, at 14; Calkins, supra note 92, at 691-92.
96 See Hearings on the Allocation of Antitrust Enforcement Between the States and
Federal Government Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission (Oct. 26, 2005)
(statement of Hon. G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, State of Maine), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/commission hearings/pdf/051026_StateEnforcTranscri
ptreform.pdf [hereinafter Statement of G. Steven Rowe]; First, supra note 52, at 1039;
COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORKING GROUP ON MERGER
ENFORCEMENT 9 (July 15, 2005), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/public-studies-fr28902/mergerpdf/050715-AAI-
Merger.pdf [hereinafter AAI COMMENTS]. For example, states need not meet the
requirements for Rule 23 class certification and states possess the power to investigate
potential violations prior to filing suit. Moreover, attorneys for the class are often criticized
as the primary beneficiaries of class action suits. See Memorandum from AMC Staff to
AMC Commissioners on Enforcement Institutions - States Discussion Memorandum (May
19, 2006), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edulamc/pdf/meetings/Enflnst -StateDiscMemopub.pdf.
97 For a more detailed explanation of this concept, see infra pp. 23-24 of this article.
9 Hearings on the Allocation of Antitrust Enforcement Between the States and the
Federal Government Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission (Oct. 26, 2005)
(statement of Harry First, Professor, New York University Law School) available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission-hearings/pdflStatement-First.pdf [hereinafter
Statement of Harry First].
9 Id; Statement of Phillip A. Proger, supra note 85, at 14; Statement of G. Steven Rowe,
supra note 97.
1OO See Statement of G. Steven Rowe, supra note 96.
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of state residents has set important precedents in a number of instances,
despite Judge Posner's assertion to the contrary, that state enforcement has
often been focused on areas of local competitive importance, and that even
when state attorneys general have gotten involved in cases that involve
global markets, their participation has been beneficial, rather than
detrimental.' 0 Finally, state attorneys general argue that state enforcement
is rooted in a strong tradition of federalism,10 2 and that states can both fill
gaps in local enforcement matters and pick up the slack by prosecuting
national or international matters during periods of lax federal
enforcement.
2. Congress Should Not Limit State Officials to the Prosecution ofLocal
Conduct
Proponents of retaining unlimited state parens patriae acknowledge
the benefits of state enforcement in local matters, but contend that state
enforcement of both national and international antitrust violations has great
benefits as well. According to Professor Harry First, there are three
problems with limiting state attorneys general to investigating and
prosecuting only local matters.104 The first is that the federal agencies are
not themselves actually confined to cases with broad geographic effects.10
Thus, limiting states will not in fact lead to a clear division of labor between
activities that are interstate and international and those that are intrastate.
Without corresponding limits on federal agencies to cases with broad
geographic effects, there will remain overlap between federal and state
enforcement leading to possible inconsistency in the outcome of suits or in
any resulting remedies imposed by a court.106
Secondly, First notes that "although it has always been difficult to
separate the local from the more national, it is increasingly difficult
today."10 7 Health care provides an important example. State attorneys
general have a great interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of
their residents, making health care a local issue. os On the other hand, a
large number of health care providers operate on the national level.109 Thus
developments crucial to an individual state resident's access to health care
101 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (making it
easier for federal as well as state authorities to prosecute antitrust cases involving foreign
defendants).
102 See, e.g., ABA Comments, supra note 62, at 6.
103 Id. at 7.
10 See First, supra note 52, at 1035; see also, ABA Comments, supra note 62, at 11-13.
105 See First, supra note 52, at 1035.
106 See id.
107 id
108 See generally id.
10 See generally id.
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may well occur outside the borders of the state."o
Third, First argues that "it is not necessarily true that the best
allocation of a state antitrust enforcement dollar is to spend it on truly local
anticompetitive agreements.""' Principles of federalism counsel against
preventing officials of a sovereign state from determining whether a state's
consumers are better served through an investiqation of an interstate
violation or by investigation of an intrastate matter. 12 In addition, in light
of the current expansive definition of interstate commerce, limiting states to
matters concerning only intrastate commerce would greatly limit their roles
as both enforcers of federal antitrust laws and guardians of the health, safety
and welfare of their residents." 3
II. THE LARGER DEBATE: TWO VIEWS OF FEDERALISM
The fundamental political and philosophical disagreement between
those who applaud concurrent state and federal enforcement of federal
antitrust law and those who view it as a problem turns on a disagreement
about the nature of federalism itself. The term "federalism" has the
disadvantage of having been used to refer to a plethora of different but
related concepts. Here it connotes a system of government, such as that in
the United States, combining national government with constituent
governments that ensures the continued existence of each and distributes
power among them so that neither is completely subordinate to the other. 114
In the federal system of the United States, Congress makes certain policy
decisions at the national level, while other decisions are made at the state
level.' '1 In theory, the members of Congress represent the collective will of
the "people of the United States," while members of state legislatures are
elected to represent the collective will of the people of their respective
no Id.; see also ABA Comments, supra note 62, at 11 -13; AAl COMMENTS, supra note
96, at 12.
' First, supra note 52, at 1035.
112 ABA Comments, supra note 62, at 11-13; Supplemental Testimony ofMaine Attorney
General G. Steven Rowe: Hearings on the Allocation of Antitrust Enforcement between the
States and Federal Government Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission 2 (2006)
(statement of Hon. G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General, State of Maine), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public studiesfr28902/enforcementpdf/060723_suppl_s
tate merger com.pdf.
113 ABA Comments, supra note 62, at 12 (under the Commerce Clause, nearly all activity
falls within interstate commerce).
114 See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 2 (3d ed.
1984); see also Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and
the Use and Abuse ofFederalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 59 (2002).
1" Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 545
(1954). I use the term "people of the United States" to stress that the purpose of federalism is
to protect the prerogatives of the "people of the states" acting collectively, rather than the
prerogative of state legislators.
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states.' 16
A primary issue in the federalism debate is whether principles of
federalism mandate, or at least point toward, a relatively strict division of
labor between state and federal governments in deciding matters of public
policy. Some have suggested that the answer is yes."' This view is
commonly referred to as dual federalism or sometimes as a "dualist view"
of federalism. Others contend that the only workable interpretation of
federalism requires that state and national governments exercise concurrent
jurisdiction to decide issues in a substantial number of areas. They assert
that demarcation of areas of public policy into separate state and national
spheres is neither mandated by the text of the Constitution nor consistent
with the intent of the Founders." 8
A. Dual Federalism
Historically, the term "dual federalism" referred to the concept that
state and national governments each possess independent, exclusive, and
non-overlapping spheres of authority. 19 As articulated by Chief Justice
Taney in 1858, "the powers of the General Government, and of the State,
although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are
yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently
of each other, within their respective spheres." 20 The theory of dual
federalism in its purest form was repudiated by both the Civil War and the
New Deal. Nevertheless, theories that tend toward a dualist view of the
structure of the U.S. government have formed a consistent thread
throughout U.S. constitutional history and have been endorsed by Justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court.121 In fact, the Rehnquist Court articulated a
116 id.
" See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (noting, in an opinion written by
J. Scalia, that "Congress cannot compel States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program," and holding that Congress "cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
States' officers directly"); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57-74 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (finding that separation of powers did not allow the federal government to
regulate California's medical marijuana program). Included among these protected values
are the autonomy and legislative prerogatives of the states. Included among these protected
values are the autonomy and legislative prerogatives of the states. See generally, Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1.
118 For a detailed discussion, see infra Part III.A. of this article.
119 The term "dual federalism" was first used by Edward Corwin. See Norman R.
Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth ofDual Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847,
1849 n.8 (2007) (citing Edward S. Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce: A
Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L. Q. 477, 481 (1933)); Robert A. Schapiro,
Toward a Theory ofInteractive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REv. 243, 246 (2005).
120 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 516 (1858).
121 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES
WITH THE STATES (2002); THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT
(Herman Schwartz ed., 2002); see COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT, supra note 31; PURCELL,
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view of federalism that, while not adhering strictly to earlier forms of dual
federalism, possessed tendencies that were "dualist in nature."l 2 2
Contemporary versions of the theory of dual federalism differ significantly
from earlier historical versions because they recognize that today the federal
and state governments possess concurrent jurisdiction in a number of areas,
but they believe that minimizing these jurisdictional overlaps is desirable.123
B. Overlapping Federalism
A body of recent scholarship has arisen to debunk the "myth of dual
federalism." 24 Scholars working in fields as disparate as corporate law and
immigration law have concluded that there are significant benefits to the
exercise of concurrent state and national jurisdiction in these particular
areas in which, as a matter of constitutional law, Congress has the option to
regulate exclusively.125 Other scholars have formulated a general theory of
the benefits of the exercise of state and federal jurisdiction. 2 6 These "anti-
dual federalism" theories of overlapping jurisdiction are referred to by
various labels.127  But each theory posits that federalism, properly
supra note 20.
122 Id. Robert A. Schapiro has written that "[d]ual federalism is dead, but not gone. Its
spirit continues to haunt contemporary discussions of federalism." Schapiro, supra note 119,
at 246.
123 Id
124 See Williams, supra note 119, at 1847.
125 For corporate law, see Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition,
Cooperation, and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2004); Marcel Kahan &
Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1573 (2005); Brett McDonell, Recent Skirmishes in the Battle Over Corporate Voting and
Governance, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 349 (2007); Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative
Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium
Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006). On the subject of
immigration law, see, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Importance of the Local in
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, The States and
Immigration in an Era ofDemi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121 (1994).
126 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2008); Schapiro, supra note 119, at 243; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, supra note 64.
127 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have coined the term "Symbiotic Federalism."
Kahan & Rock, supra note 125. Robert B. Ahdieh has written about "Dialectical
Regulation." See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical Regulation ofRule 14a-8: Intersystemic
Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 165 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh,
Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 863 (2006). Robert Cover has written of
"Jurisdictional Redundancy." Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy:
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981). Robert Thompson's
work discussing the notion of "collaborative" regulation provides yet another example.
Thompson, supra note 125.
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understood and implemented, can lead to the best of both worlds in a truly
federal (rather than exclusively state or national) regulatory scheme. All
describe a middle ground between federal and state governance in economic
regulation of activities that are at least national in scope. Many of these
authors rely on the idea that there is a market in regulatory rules in which
"best regulatory practices" tend to emerge after contesting with competing
regulatory philosophies. Each posits, however, that federalism, when not
limited by attempts to divide responsibilities cleanly between state and
national authorities, can lead to better and more effective regulation than
could either an exclusively state or national regulatory scheme. Proponents
of overlapping theories of federalism assert that upon close examination,
constitutional principles do not mandate a theory of near-exclusive state and
federal jurisdiction. 8 In their view, the Constitution leaves the issue of the
proper working relationship between state 9overnments and the federal
government an open question in most areas. 9 Indeed, one commentator
argues that the writings of the Founders, particularly those of James
Madison, provide more support for the view that concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction is more consistent with fundamental principles of
federalism than "dualist" theories. 130
Proponents of overlapping federalism point out that while dual
federalism ideas claim to base the desirability of dividing state and federal
power on the need to protect the autonomy of the states, in practice such
theories generally operate to restrict state regulatory power. 3 1 Others stress
that doctrines such as federal preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause,
and dormant foreign affairs preemption adequately serve to protect national
prerogatives from unwarranted exercises of state power.1 Under these
doctrines, they assert, Congress has the means to determine whether it
wishes to regulate the area exclusively, leave the area to state regulation, or
allow concurrent regulation.133 Given this power, the risk that state actions
will interfere with national policy is slim.
128 PURCELL, supra note 20; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 58 ("The
Constitution is silent about the allocation of power between state and federal governments.
Nor can major premises be derived from the intent of the framers. Ultimately, the analysis
must focus on what is the most desirable division of authority between state and federal
governments; that is, what arrangement will best lead to effective government. This
analysis, of necessity, is functional.").
129 See PURCELL, supra note 20, at 3-6.
130 See Jones, supra note 125, at 121-23.
131 See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 483 (1997); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126.
132 Schapiro, supra note 119, at 260.
1 See,e.g., id.; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126; Gardbaum, supra note 131.
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C. Dual and Overlapping Federalism in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Before and during the nineteenth century, the predominant view held
that the national government was one of limited, delegated powers and that
the states were independent sovereigns possessing all non-delegated
powers, including exclusive authority over identifiably "local" matters. 134
In Supreme Court commerce clause jurisprudence, the model of dual
federalism divided commerce into two types: intrastate commerce, which
was to be regulated by the states, and interstate commerce, which fell under
the purview of Congress. 13 5 In theory, an important function of dual
federalism was to ensure that each level of government safeguarded its own
sovereign prerogatives so as to continually check the expansionist efforts of
the others.136
From the late nineteenth century until 1937, principles of dual
federalism were at times used to construe the scope of Congress's power to
legislate under the Commerce Clause narrowly.13 7  The "Constitutional
Revolution of 1937" effectively ended the use of dual federalism principles
in commerce clause jurisprudence.138 In the course of upholding the new
regulatory initiatives of the New Deal, the Court affirmed that there were
virtually no judicially enforceable limits to the areas over which Congress
could legislate. 3 9 A necessary implication of this principle was that the
exercise of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction was appropriate in a
great many areas. This implication was necessary because, unless one
accepted that concurrent authority existed, the finding that the national
government could now exercise authority over a large number of areas
previously considered within the province of state governments would have
resulted in a massive preemption of existing state law.14 0 This, however,
did not occur. First of all, Congress's passage of the 1933 and 1934
Securities Acts did not invalidate the existing body of state blue-sky
laws.141 Similarly, Congress's establishment of the Federal
134 Some legal scholars have argued that the theory that the Supreme Court was ever
committed to a dual federalist interpretation is only a myth. See, e.g., Williams, supra note
119.
131 Id. at 1850.
136 PURCELL, supra note 20, at 178 (citing Edward S. Corbin, The Passing of Dual
Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950)). For a judicial statement, see Tarble's Case, 80 U.S.
397, 406 (1871).
137 Not everyone accepts that the Supreme Court ever truly embraced the theory of dual
federalism. See Williams, supra note 119, at 1851-52.
1' See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (describing the relationship between dual federalism,
the Commerce Clause, and the "Constitutional Revolution").
19 id.
140 Id. See also Gardbaum, supra note 131.
141 See generally, Brian J. Fahrney, Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for
Federal Pre-Emption Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 Nw.
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Communications Commission ("FCC") did not negate the authority of state
public utility commissions over various media of communications. 4 2
A major result of the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937," then, was
the tacit acknowledgment of the death of dual federalism. The New Deal
cases held that Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause
was virtually unlimited.14 Both those in favor of the sweeping
constitutional changes wrought by the Court's validation of the New Deal
statutes and those opposed to those changes understood that state
governments had not been dispossessed of their extensive police powers to
regulate in the interest of the public health and welfare of their citizens in
every area in which Congress would now be allowed to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. This meant that now very large areas of economic and
other activity in the United States would be subject to regulation by both
state legislatures and by Congress.
Before the "switch in time that saved nine," the Supreme Court took
responsibility for policing the line between state and federal power. 144
After the Court abdicated this responsibility, Professor Herbert Wechsler
developed a theory to explain that such policing was unnecessary because
the national government could be trusted not to intrude into the areas
properly under the purview of state legislatures. 145 His theory, as elaborated
by Professor Jesse Choper, became known as the "The Political Safeguards
of Federalism."1 46 In Wechsler's view, decision-making by Congress is not
inherently aimed at increasing national power at the expense of the states. 147
Rather, the design of the Constitution serves to preserve state legislatures'
authority over "subjects that dominant state interests wish preserved for
state control."l4 8 Consistent with this theory, for approximately thirty years
after the Court's validation of New Deal legislation, the Supreme Court
made no attempt to limit Congress's ability to legislate under the
Commerce Clause on federalism grounds. 149
The Supreme Court appeared to signal a change in course in 1976,
when it suggested that Congress had no power to regulate in certain areas
under the Commerce Clause because those areas fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the states.150 In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court
U. L. REv. 753 (1992).
142 Matthew S. Bewig, Federalism and Telecommunications: On the Right Wavelength?,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1190, 1190-95 (1991).
143 See e.g. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
'" See CUSHMAN, supra note 138.
145 See generally Wechsler, supra note 115, at 547-48.
146 Id; Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-6- Vis the States: The
Dispensability ofJudicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
147 Wechsler, supra note 115, at 543-52.
148 Id. at 548.
149 See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
150 id.
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held that Congress could not regulate the activities of state governments in
areas of "traditional" or "integral" state responsibility.15 ' But the Court
overruled Usery in 1985 when it decided Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, which declined to recognize judicially
enforceable limits on federal authority under the Commerce Clause.15 2 In
Garcia, the Court explicitly relied on Professor Wechsler's theory and
stated it would no longer strike down federal statutes for intruding on
"traditional functions" of state government because "the principal means
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system
lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."' 53  The Court
elaborated:
The Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special
restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the
workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete
limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign
interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power.154
This view of Congress's commerce power held sway for many years.
Concepts reminiscent of dual federalism reemerged in a series of
Supreme Court cases beginning with Gregory v. Ashcroft in 1991 and
followed by New York v. United States, United States v. Lopez, Printz v.
United States and United States v. Morrison.155  These cases are often
referred to as the Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism" or "The Federalism
Revival."' 56 The quintessential dual federalist tone of these decisions is
Justice Scalia's statement in United States v. Morrison that "[t]he
Constitution re uires a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local." Although "dualist" in the sense of tending to allocate
areas of competence to either the state governments or to Congress, the
understanding of federalism embodied in the Rehnquist Court's cases
differs significantly from the strict dual federalism of the pre-New Deal
Era.158 For example, proponents of the "new federalism" do not insist that
"s' Id at 843, 852.
152 Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
" Id. at 550.
154 Id. at 522.
1ss See e.g. Gregory v. Ashcroft , 501 U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
156 See Williams, supra note 119, at 1853; see also id at 1849 ("The Court has expressly
and repeatedly endorsed a dualist doctrinal framework for the Commerce Clause.").
Is' Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
1 According to Robert A. Schapiro: "Dual federalism is dead, but not gone. Its spirit
continues to haunt contemporary discussions of federalism." See Schapiro, supra note 119,
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concurrent state and federal jurisdiction is always inappropriate because it is
indisputable that the two levels of government today both regulate in a great
many areas. In many of these areas, including criminal law and
environmental law, concurrent jurisdiction is well established.'"9
Despite this difference, the "new federalism" cases reflect aspects of
the theory of dual federalism. Robert Shapiro explains it this way:
Dual federalism defined the core issue of federalism as the
separation of state and national power. The rigid boundary that dual
federalism sought to erect has disappeared, but the basic conception
of federalism continues to be a system of independent national and
state governments that must be protected from each other.
Federalism remains an exercise in line-drawing.16 0
That the Printz decision rests on this view of federalism can be seen in the
majority opinion in which Justice Scalia stated that "[i]t is incontestable that
the Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty."l61
In 2000, the Court again relied on principles of dual federalism in
United States v. Morrison to hold that Congress lacked authority to regulate
non-economic activity that had traditionally fallen within the states' police
powers.162 In that case, Justice Scalia explained the need to demarcate areas
of respective state and national authority, stating that: "The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local." 63 In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that in an area that has been
at 246. Actual "cooperative federalism," Shapiro explains, was developed by political
scientists and emphasizes voluntary interaction rather than a system for resolving
jurisdictional conflicts arising between states and the federal government. Id. at 248.
159 See Basil J. Musnuff, Note, Concurrent Jurisdiction Over RICO Claims, 73 CORNELL
L. REv. 1047 (1988); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J.
1003 (2001).
16o Shapiro, supra note 119, at 246; see also Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and
Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REv. 731, 820 (2004)
("[T]he dominant tendency in U.S. jurisprudence has been to view the projects of federal and
state governance as essentially distinct and to solve intergovernmental conflicts by trying to
establish clear boundaries between the two.").
Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
162 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19.
161 Id. at 617-18. Justice Scalia has articulated why his particular reading of
constitutional history has convinced him of the need for the Court to police the boundaries of
state and federal power. See generally Antonin Scalia, American Federalism and the
Supreme Court, in THE NEw FEDERALISM: STRUCTURES AND INFRASTRUCTURES, AMERICAN
AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 56, 57-81 (Kjell Ake Modeer ed. 2000). In Scalia's view, the
increased size and power of the national government relative to the states now mandates that
the Court step in to protect state prerogatives. Id. More specifically he argues: "[t]he vast
expansion of the federal government in this century is attributable ... to two constitutional
amendments and three elements of judicial constitutional interpretation." Id. The
constitutional amendments were the Seventeenth Amendment, which eliminated the direct
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traditionally regulated by the states, Congress has no power to regulate
noneconomic, private activity based merely upon a cumulative substantial
effect of that activity on interstate commerce.'6" Thus, Morrison further
limited the scope of Congress's commerce power, originally subjected to
limits in Lopez, by narrowing Congress's ability to regulate based on
findings of substantial effects on interstate commerce in areas deemed to be
both "noneconomic," as well as traditionally regulated by the states.
Had the activity been deemed to fall within the ambit of "economic"
activity, however, Congress's power to regulate it would have withstood the
Court's scrutiny, even if the activity had been one traditionally regulated by
the states. This fact led Justice Thomas to express a concern for the future
of federalism in his concurring opinion: "Until this Court replaces its
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent
with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress
appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating
commerce." Thomas's opinion reflects the influence of dual federalism
principles in his suggestion that power exercised by the federal government
is necessarily power appropriated from the states. Thomas apparently
found this to be troubling given his understanding of the importance of the
states as wielders of police powers and guardians of the public interest.
In the aftermath of Morrison, the Supreme Court appears to have
moderated its interest in limiting Congress's power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. For example, the Supreme Court refused to overturn
Congressional legislation on federalism grounds in Pierce County,
Washington, v. Guillen.16 6  In that case, the Supreme Court unanimously
reaffirmed Congress's power to legislate in the area of road safety as a part
of its power to regulate the channels of international trade.16 7  The Court
election of senators by state legislators, and the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorized the
federal government to impose an income tax that, Scalia argues, now allows the national
government to spend money in almost any area. The two other elements of judicial
constitutional interpretation that have permitted the extensive expansion of federal powers in
this century are the Supreme Court's broad reading of the Commerce Clause since the New
Deal and its expansive construction of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justices Lewis Powell and Sandra Day O'Connor have voiced similar opinions
based on formal constitutional amendments and extra constitutional developments, such as
the emergence of a national two-party system. See generally Mark Tushnet, Globalization
and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000) (arguing that the Framers'
original design to protect state prerogatives has been eroded by historical constitutional
changes).
16 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126. In Morrison, the Court
deemed the regulated activity, violence against women, to be insufficiently related to
interstate commerce, even though the plaintiff had alleged that such violence had a
substantial effect on the national economy.
161 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
'6 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
161 Id at 147-48.
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said nothing to indicate that recognizing this authority would deprive states
of their authority to continue to regulate road safety as a core function of
their mandate to protect the health, safety and welfare of their residents.
Similarly, in Sabri v. United States, the Court upheld a federal law
outlawing the bribery of state, local, and tribal officials receiving at least
$10,000 in federal funds, without indicating that in doing so it intended to
interfere with the ability of state officials to prosecute such criminal
168activity.
In Gonzales v. Raich, in 2005, the Court allowed Congress, under its
commerce power, to prohibit an activity (the cultivation and use of
marijuana for certain purposes) in an area traditionally regulated by the
states, despite a California law allowing the activity. 169 The Court in Raich
relied on Wickard v. Filburn for the proposition that the intrastate (or local)
production of a commodity sold in interstate commerce constituted
"economic activity," and that Congress could base a finding of a
"substantial effect on commerce" by looking to the cumulative impact of
such conduct.170 The Court stated that "[c]ase law firmly establishes
Congress' power to regulate purely local activities that are a part of an
economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."171
Justices O'Connor and Thomas both dissented in Raich, but for
somewhat different reasons. Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority
because she perceived a need to protect the "historic spheres of state
sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment."1 72 In her view, the state
regulation at issue should have been upheld because "[t]he States' core
police powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens."l 73 In Justice
O'Connor's view, the Court should preserve a core area of state
sovereignty, but she acknowledged the difficulty of "drawing a meaningful
line between what is national and what is local." 74 In Justice Thomas's
dissent, he agreed with Justice O'Connor that states have important
responsibilities for safeguarding the public welfare of their citizens.175 He
disagreed with the majority's validation of the federal law, however,
because "[h]ere, Congress has encroached on States' traditional police
powers to define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and
168 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
169 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2005).
170 Id. at 17 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
173 Id
174 Id. at 49.
175 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 57-74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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welfare of their citizens."l 76
III. RESOLVING THE FEDERALISM DEBATE
A. There is No Constitutional Mandate for Dual Federalism
The text of the Constitution itself nowhere mentions the word
"federalism." In addition, no consensus exists regarding the Founders'
intentions regarding the desirability of exclusive versus overlapping state
and federal jurisdiction. On balance, however, those who argue that there is
no constitutional mandate for dual federalism have made a more persuasive
historical case for their view than have advocates of dual federalism.177
1. The Founders'Assumptions Regarding Concurrency
In his exhaustively researched book, Federalism: An Historical
Inquiry, Edward Purcell makes a convincing case for the proposition that
the Founders did not address the issue of concurrency in the text of the
Constitution or in the debates leading up to its ratification.'78 His review of
historical evidence relating to the Constitutional Convention indicates that
the Founders often disagreed among themselves about the proper roles of
the state and federal governments they created.'79 Moreover, to the extent
the Founders held particular views in common, such views were the result
of historical accident rather than due to a common adherence to a particular
theory of federalism.1so In his view, only a very few questions about the
form of government they were creating were actually decided
176 Id. at 66.
I7 PURCELL, supra note 20; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126, at 58 ("The
Constitution is silent about the allocation of power between state and federal governments.
Nor can major premises be derived from the intent of the framers."); Williams, supra note
119, at 1926 ("[T]here is no universal, a priori definition of what a federal government may
do and what residual power state governments must have. There are a number of
permissible models of constitutional federalism, of which dual federalism is only one.").
178 PURCELL, supra note 20.
1 Id at 177-78. ("From the first days of Washington's presidency, the members of the
founding generation demonstrated that they shared no determinate and comprehensive
agreement on the federal structure or the lines of division between national and state
powers.").
180 Id. at 177. He cites for this proposition HERBERT J. STORING, TOWARD A MORE
PERFECT UNION: THE WRITINGS OF HERBERT J. STORING 81 (Joseph M. Bessette ed. 1995);
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 168, 201 (1997); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at
204-06, 210-13 (2005); Murray Dry, Anti-Federalism in The Federalist: A Founding
Dialogue on the Constitution, Republican Government, and Federalism, in SAVING THE
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definitively. 81 Such actual decisions held that the states would continue to
have a separate sovereign existence, but that in case of conflict, federal law
was to be supreme. 182 Thus Purcell argues that no true or correct balance of
state and federal authority ever existed to be found by historians or jurists:
"The Constitution neither gave the federal structure any proper shape as an
operating system of government nor mandated any particular and timeless
balance among its components. The Constitution established a structure
that accepted certain types of change as natural and desirable."l8 3 His
ultimate conclusion is that for scholars of constitutional law, "sound
constitutional reasoning on federalism issues has to move beyond
originalism and 'principle' and ground itself on specific, pragmatic and
empirically based analyses of the operation of the federal structure and the
likely practical consequences involved in accepting any particular
interpretation of its nature and limits."l84
Even if it were possible to know how the Founders expected
federalism to operate as an initial matter, however, there is no way to know
with any certainty how their ideas would have evolved in response to
changed circumstances. For example, if it could be proven that the
Founders expected the states and the federal government to operate in
separate spheres, this was only one of many, perhaps equally important,
assumptions that they held. Thus, there is no way to know how the
Founders would resolve the challenge to their system brought about by
expanding notions of the Commerce Clause. There is a great deal of
evidence s that the Founders placed great importance on allowing states to
exercise their plenary police powers, suggesting that if changing
circumstances put these two norms in conflict, it is impossible to know how
the Founders would have resolved the resulting dilemma.
2. The Founders'Assumptions Regarding the Importance of State Police
Powers
The Founders understood that while the powers of the national
government were to be specifically enumerated and limited, state
governments were to exercise a plenary "police power" which they were to
wield in the interest of promoting the public welfare, which included
promoting peace and security from crime, public safety and health, public
order and comfort, and public morals.'8 6 States were also the guardians of
the dependent classes of its citizens.18 The all-encompassing nature of
181 PURCELL, supra note 20, at 177.
182 id.
183 Id. at 7.
184 Id. at 9.
185 See generally Williams, supra note 119.
186 Id.
187 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs 317
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state governments' police powers explain why, despite the grant to
Congress of the power to regulate interstate commerce, the Founders
assumed that, in a world where most business activity took place within the
confines of a single state, state governments would be the primary
regulators of business.188  In the 18th and early 19th centuries, their
assumptions were born out. In fact, Congress failed to enact any substantial
regulations of commercial activity.189 According to historian William
Novak:
In the 18th and most of the 19th century's state and local
governments conducted the overwhelming amount of the nation's
public business. Their extensive activities ranged from substantial
efforts to stimulate economic development to relatively continuous
supervision of many of the most basic areas of daily life. The idea of
"salus populi", the right and power of the people to secure their
general welfare, underlay political debate and legal regulation. With
little or no national involvement, state and local governments
enforced "minute and ubiquitous regulations shaping the most
important public policy concerns of the nineteenth century: public
safety, ublic economy, public property, public morals and public
health. "'
The lack of federal commercial regulation in the early years of the
nation is unsurprising in light of the Tenth Amendment, which expressly
sets out a presumption in favor of state regulatory power over most issues
by providing that all residual governmental powers remain with state
governments.191 Similarly, in Federalist No. 45, James Madison stated that,
The powers delegated . . . to the federal government, are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite . . . The powers reserved to the several
states will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
3. Historical Overlap between the Regulation of Commerce and the
Exercise ofPolice Powers
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall held that even in an area
(Kermit L. Hall ed.,1992) (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904)); Williams, supra note i19, at 1859.
188 See generally Williams, supra note 119.
189 Id. at 1854.
190 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 235 (1996).
'91 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
192 THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
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that could be termed interstate commerce, the states retained their police
powers to enact regulations for the health, safety, morals, or welfare of their
citizenry. 193 Marshall's analysis took into account the fact that "the sphere
of federal commercial regulation overlapped with the sphere of state police
regulations," and that in this area of overlap, the states and the federal
government would exercise concurrent jurisdiction.194
A number of subsequent Supreme Court cases stressed the importance
of state police powers and recognized the concurrent state authority in areas
also regulated by Congress, such as interstate and foreign commerce. For
example, in 1873, the Court relied on the states' traditional police power to
uphold state commercial regulation in the Slaughter-House Cases.1 95 In
Munn v. Illinois, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a state's
exercise of its police power for the purpose of regulating private
business.196  In 1934, the Court upheld concurrent state and federal
regulation of the same conduct in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
and Nebbia v. New York.197
From the 19th century until today, a significant body of law related to
business and commercial activities has remained exclusively the province
of state legislatures. For example, in the early 19th century, the primary
means of regulating business activities was state enforcement of its own
corporate law and other bodies of common law such as the law of
partnership and unfair competition.'98 Beginning in the mid to late 19th
century, state governments also exercised control over business b
establishing state regulatory commissions, such as railroad commissions.
193 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
194 See Williams, supra note 119, at 1859.
195 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
196 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Other cases upholding state economic regulatory measures
include Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
197 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v. N.Y., 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
198 Perhaps the most important way that state governments exerted control over business
corporations was through the state's exclusive authority to issue corporate charters. Early
corporate charters often contained state imposed restrictions on corporate activities, such as
owning the shares of another corporation, or a charter might provide that the state possessed
the power to regulate the rates charged by the business. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 63 (2005). States enforced the
restrictions in corporate charters through quo warranto actions against corporations who
engaged in acts that were ultra vires or outside the limitations the state provided in their
charters. The power to limit the activities of corporations through such charter restrictions
allowed states a great degree of control over business activities affecting their residents
because in the late 1800s, states also had the power to exclude corporations chartered in
other states from doing business within their borders.
1 The first regulatory agency in America was a railroad commission established by
Rhode Island in 1839. See THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 17 (1984). The
first effective commission was established by Massachusetts in 1869. Id. at 18. States
initially attempted to control railroads by requiring them to operate under special charters
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The growth of the railroads was also a prime motivating factor leading state
legislatures to pass antitrust statutes.200
The rise of railroads raised novel issues of federalism because they
simultaneously operated in both intrastate and interstate markets.
Beginning in 1871, the legislatures of Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and
Iowa passed laws regulating the rates railroads could charge within each
state.2  Federal railroad regulation followed soon afterward in 1887 with
the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 202 But the
advent of federal railroad regulation did not automatically oust states'
authority to regulate these entities, which had an enormous impact on the
health, safety, and welfare of their residents.203
The readjustment of concepts of federalism that began with the rise of
the railroads continued through the post-New Deal period, as the Great
Depression created additional economic problems that states could not
resolve through the exercise of their police powers alone. In an attempt to
deal with the hardship caused by the Depression, the New Deal legislation
and the "Supreme Court Revolution of 1937" together enlarged the
boundaries of the areas in which the national government could exercise its
power over interstate commerce.2 04 But the new national legislation did not
automatically preempt or replace the states' exercise of police powers in
these areas. Rather, as with the passage of the federal antitrust laws, state
law was expected to continue to apply concurrently with the new overlay of
federal regulation.205
from the state legislature which often imposed strict conditions on their operations. As the
economic power of the railroads grew exponentially, this method of control proved
ineffective, prompting a number of state legislatures to enact special regulatory legislation to
address the "railroad problem."
200 Id. at 57.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 63. While it became clear in the 1880s that state jurisdiction extended only over
local, intrastate routes, the Supreme Court allowed states to exert substantial influence on
interstate routes by classifying the interstate effects as merely "indirect" until 1920 when
Congress expressly preempted most state rate-making power in the Transportation Act of
1920. Id. It was presaged by the Supreme Court's decision in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific
Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), in which the Court held that commerce
originating or ending outside the boundaries of a state could not be regulated by that state,
even though the federal government provided no alternative means of regulation. Id. at 564.
203 While it became clear in the 1880s that state jurisdiction over railroads extended only
to local intrastate routes, the Supreme Court allowed states to exert substantial influence on
interstate routes by classifying the interstate effects as merely "indirect." McCRAw, supra
note 199, at 63. This ended in 1920 when Congress expressly preempted most state rate-
making power in the Transportation Act of 1920. Id.
204 Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes
Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1891 (1994).
205 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Nebbia v. N.Y., 291
U.S. 502 (1934) (allowing both state and federal regulation of the same area); see also
CUSHMAN, supra note 138.
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4. Flawed Logic of the New Federalism Decisions
The most recent cases to stress the idea that separate spheres of state
and federal competence exist are sometimes referred to as the "New
Federalism" cases or "Federalism Revival." 206 In these cases, the Court
invalidated a number of federal statutes on the grounds that they intruded
on state power.207 In doing so, the Court relied on the Founders' original
intent to limit the powers of the national government and to protect the
sovereignty of the states.208 The idea was that because the states originally
played a greater role in regulating American life than they do currently, and
the federal government a lesser role than it does currently, the Founders
would wish to reduce the power wielded by the federal government as a
result of the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause .209 But limiting the power of the federal government is only
necessary if one assumes that the Founders intended a system of dual
federalism that allowed little if any room for concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction. In a system of overlapping federalism, there is no conflict
between the desire to allow states to play an important role in the
constitutional order through the exercise of plenary police powers and the
expanded scope of action accorded the federal government under modem
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Today, under cases such as Raich, which confirmed that the Supreme
Court recognizes few limits on the reach of national power, there remains
no significant area of economic activity left to the states if state authority
must exist only where federal authority does not.210  Thus, if state
governments are limited to addressing truly "local" problems, they will lose
their role as guardians of the public welfare. It is this fact that led Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Thomas to disagree with the majority in Raich,
because they thought the majority's opinion did not sufficiently take into
account the need to protect "historic spheres of state sovereignty from
excessive federal encroachment. . . ."2 The historic spheres of state
authority that most concerned them were those related to the states' police
powers. O'Connor stated, "[t]he States' core police powers have always
included authority ... to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their
,,212
citizens."2 In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas expressed a similar




210 A significant exception to this generalization is regulation of the "business of
insurance" which is carried out primarily at the state level due to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-
1015). Even here, states have primary regulatory authority only because Congress granted it
to them.
211 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212 id
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view when he stated, "Here, Congress has encroached on the states'
traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens."2 13
In Raich, both the majority and the minority were correct. The
majority correctly held that Congress could regulate in the area at issue and
that principles of federal supremacy invalidated contrary state law. But
given the dissenters' dual federalist assumptions about regulatory authority,
a finding that the federal government did have authority to regulate the
activity under the Commerce Clause in such cases of local conduct does
threaten to encroach on the states' traditional police powers, if one assumes
that constitutional principles forbid areas of jurisdictional overlap. The
solution, however, is not to find that Congress has no authority to regulate
in this area, but to accept concurrent state and federal authority to regulate
the conduct. A specific finding of the preemption of a particular state
statute encroaches far less on the states' traditional police powers than
would a finding that any state regulation of an area is invalid because
Congress may exercise its regulatory power in that arena if it chooses to do
so.
In light of the size of the entities that governments must regulate today,
it is not feasible to vest the primary responsibility for economic regulation
exclusively at the state level. But even if it could be proven that the
Founders assumed a system of dual federalism, given that they also
assumed a system of federalism in which states possessed plenary police
powers, there is no reason to assume they would prefer their vision with
respect to concurrency over their vision with regard to the role of state
governments as primary guardians of the public welfare.2 14
B. Why Overlapping Jurisdiction is Consistent with Fundamental
Principles of Federalism
1. Madison's Theory of State and Federal Competition for the People's
Affection
Corporate law professor Renee Jones has argued that "the concept of
vertical competition was central to the framers' vision of the federalist
system."2 15  Using the term vertical federalism to refer to competition
between state governments and the federal government, she argues that
overlapping state and federal jurisdiction is necessary in order to allow the
two levels of government to compete for the affection or loyalty of U.S.
213 Id. at 66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
214 See Williams, supra note 119, at 1924 (arguing that the New Federalism decisions are
"driven by the impulse to circumscribe federal authority so as to reserve some matters
exclusively for state or local regulation").
215 Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform,
29 J. CoP. L. 625, 634 (2004).
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216
citizens. For this proposition, she relies on the writings of James
Madison in Federalist No. 46.217
In order for the two levels of government to compete, it is necessary
that both should have the constitutional authority to regulate in the same
areas. Under these circumstances, voters have the opportunity to lobby for
state regulation if they have more confidence in the competence of their
state governments. It also allows voters to lobby Congress to pass
legislation preempting any state law measures that lack popular support.218
Such vertical competition is impossible under a system of dual federalism
that attempts to separate the areas in which the state and federal government
are able to compete. Without concurrent jurisdiction, voters presented with
incompetent or insufficient regulation from the level of government
assigned to a particular sphere will have little recourse. Jones considers a
system of overlapping jurisdiction necessary in order for state regulation to
serve as a regulatory "safety valve." 2 19
2. Federalism as Expressing a Constitutional Preference for Robust
Debate on Matters ofPublic Policy
A number of scholars have stressed that much of federalism's value
lies in the opportunity it provides for dialogue and debate in the course of
state and federal competition in the formation of public policy.2 20 When
both state and federal power is available to deal with a social problem, the
public reaps the advantages of exposure to multiple approaches to solving
the problem and of full political debate over policy choices. According to
Judith Resnick,
the federated system within the United States-with its hundred plus
mentions of the word state in the Constitution and its tripartite
division of federal power-entails aspirations for transparent,
redundant debates about laws and policies. These multiple sites for
conflicts about social norms are the opportunities provided by
democratic federalism to permit problems to be argued in more than
one forum and more than once.
Similarly, David Schapiro has written that "the true genius of
American federalism lies in the continuing and constitutionally assured
basis for dialogue-for moral, political, economic and social debate over
216 Id. at 635.
217 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison)).
218 Jones, supra note 215, at 637.
219 Id. at 639.
220 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 126; Hills, Jr., supra note 126, at 3; Schapiro,
supra note 119, at 248.
221 Resnik, infra note 228, at 41.
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the merits of the allocation of power."2 2 2 Robert Ahdieh's view of
federalism as a forum for interaction is similar. He writes,
the goal is not to identify the single regulatory actor best suited to or
most appropriately charged with responsibility for a given entity or
subject matter. Rather, multiple regulators are embraced as having a
shared-if both competing and cooperating- ace in a more
inclusive and all encompassing regulatory regime.
Under this view, overlapping regulatory jurisdiction offers the public four
benefits: better regulatory rules, a failsafe in case of regulatory failure at a
particular level of government, increased innovation in policymaking, and
224increased integration across systems.
Any concerns that such inclusive policy debates will too often result in
excessively fragmented national or international policies is greatly
mitigated by the fact that Congress has the power to best the states by using
its preemption power in any cases involving either interstate or foreign
commerce. Critics of state involvement in issues with national or
international implications often invoke Dormant Commerce Clause-type
concerns when thinking of the consistency of such state involvement with
constitutional principles. Perhaps the better view is that the opportunities
for debate, competition, and interaction provided by a view of federalism
that accepts concurrent jurisdiction is more consistent with the
constitutional principles embodied in the First Amendment.
C. The Impossibility of Drawing a Clear Dividing Line between the "Truly
Local" and the "Truly National"
The biggest advantage that theories embracing concurrent jurisdiction
have over dualist theories is that it is not possible to draw a principled line
between what is "local" and what is "national."225 The difficulty is not
merely a problem in theory. As one corporate law scholar writes,
A review of academic literature and judicial opinions that seek to
enforce notions of federalism shows that efforts to define appropriate
boundaries between federal and state authority over corporate
regulation are incoherent at best. In the end, such efforts fail because
no workable conception exists on which to base such divisions.
The problem is that most contemporary problems are both local and non-
222 DAVID L. SCHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 140 (1995).
223 Robert Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 863, 872 (2006).
224 Id. at 882-83.
225 PURCELL, supra note 20, at 175.
226 Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate
Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879 (2006).
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local. In other words, "every national activity has its local aspects and
every local activity has a national perspective."22 7
Looking to the original understanding of the Founders for guidance in
ascertaining the contemporary meaning of the word "local" is especially
problematic because the very definition of the word "local" has changed
over time.228 The Founders' view that states would exercise their police
powers in response to threats to the public welfare of state residents most
likely assumed that the those residents were most in need of protection from
local actors and circumstances. This is no longer the case, because today's
"local" issue is unlikely to have a "local" cause.229 The issue of the local
harms arising due to global warming is a good example of this. 23 0 Judith
Resnik has argued:
[E]fforts to essentialize a certain kind of problem as intrinsically to
be decided by a particular level of government are doomed to fail, as
many of today's challenges have local, national, and global
dimensions. Whether the problem is rape or global warming, the
toys in a child's hands (and mouth), or the birds that fly over us and
the mercury in the water nearby, one cannot presume that problems
are "truly national" or "truly local," as many issues are both local
and national as well as domestic and foreign.
Since proponents of non-dualist theories of federalism do not accept the
need or possibility of separating the local from the national, they assert that
the better question to ask is how state and national regulators can coordinate
"to maximize the benefits of concurrent authority and minimize its
burdens."232
IV. RESOLVING THE ENFORCEMENT DEBATE
Analysis of the federalism debate strongly indicates that theories of
227 AARON WILDAVSKY, FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL CULTURE 68 (David Schleicher &
Brendon Swedlow eds., 1988).
228 See PURCELL, supra note 20, at 161-85; see generally Judith Resnik, Foreign as
Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in
Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007) (discussing the relation
between federalism, international relations, and what is considered local).
229 According to Purcell, "[a]t the beginning of the twenty-first century... the typical
"local" issue seldom involved values or habits peculiar to a particular location but rather
questions raised by the relationship between specific geographic areas and powerful
institutions and interests rooted in other parts of the nation or world." PURCELL, supra note
20, at 175.
230 See David R. Hodas, State Law Responses to Global Warming: Is It Constitutional to
Think Globally and Act Locally?, 21 PACE ENvnT. L. REV. 53 (2003).
231 Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland,
73 Mo. L. REV. 1105, 1123 (2008).
232 Jones, supra note 226, at 880.
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federalism that accept overlapping areas of state and federal jurisdiction do
not suffer from any general overarching constitutional infirmities. A
remaining question is whether principles of federalism counsel against
overlapping exercises of state and federal jurisdiction in the specific context
of antitrust enforcement. If not, the question becomes whether a statutory
regime that relies on concurrent state and federal antitrust enforcement is
more likely to promote the twin goals of consumer welfare and good
governance than other possible enforcement schemes. An examination of
the history of concurrent antitrust enforcement, and possible constitutional
objections to concurrent enforcement of antitrust, reveals that there are no
persuasive constitutional objections to concurrent enforcement in the
antitrust context. It also reveals a number of ways in which concurrent
enforcement actively promotes important principles of federalism.
A. History of Concurrent Antitrust Enforcement
In the early years of the Sherman Act, states continued to actively
enforce state antitrust measures, despite the presence of concurrent federal
antitrust enforcement.2 33 In doing so, they did not limit their enforcement
efforts to anticompetitive restraints with only local or in-state effects. For
example, in 1890, in People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., the state of
New York successfully sued a member of the National Sugar Trust.234 Two
years later, in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Standard Oil Co., the Ohio
Attorney General sued Standard Oil and won a court order severing that
company's connection with the Standard Oil Trust.235
Over time, federal antitrust enforcement increased and came to
overshadow state enforcement.23 6  Beginning in the 1960s, however, the
states as a group increased their involvement in antitrust enforcement by
bringing class actions on behalf of the states themselves and their
consumers. At least one of these suits involved antitrust claims against237 bro nirs
multinational pharmaceutical companies. The number of antitrust
lawsuits filed by state attorneys general increased again in 1976, after
233 Between 1890 and 1902, the federal government filed 19 antitrust suits and the states
filed 28 suits. See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L. J.
375, 378 (1983).
234 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890). See James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the
Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-
1918, 135 U. PA L. REv 495,495-501 (1987).
235 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892).
236 Hovenkamp, supra note 233; May, supra note 234.
237 See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333
F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.), amended, 333 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied sub.
nom.; Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1971); West Va. V. Chas. P. Pfizer & Co.,
314 F. Supp. 710 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub. nom.; Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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Congress passed the H-S-R Act.238 A third increase in state antitrust
enforcement in the 1980s corresponded to a decrease in federal antitrust
enforcement during the Reagan era.239 A number of state attorneys general
increased their level of interest in enforcing antitrust prohibitions because
they considered this new enforcement policy to be inadequate to protect
240their citizens from illegal anticompetitive activities.
As a result, in 1983, a number of state attorneys general created a
Multistate Antitrust Task Force under the auspices of the National
Association of Attorneys General designed to provide what they considered
to be a necessary state supplement to federal enforcement. 24 During the
1980s and 1990s, both the NAAG Task Force and individual state attorney
general offices brought cases that set important legal precedents in a
number of areas, including the international arena.242 In many instances,
state attorneys general became involved in the case only after the DOJ
declined to investigate the alleged offenses.2 43
In recent years, state antitrust enforcement efforts have often been
aimed at areas related to the states' traditional powers to safeguard the
public health, safety, and welfare. For example, the NAAG Multistate
Antitrust Task Force has brought a number of cases in areas that involve the
provision of health care, such as multi-state suits successfully challengin
pharmaceutical patent misuse that delays competition from generic drugs.24
238 See Himes, supra note 50.
239 Id; See also Lloyd Constantine, June 22, 2004, Remarks to the American Antitrust
Institute, June 22, 2004 at 3. During the Reagan Administration the number of staff attorneys
in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice was cut from 467 to 209. Id. The size
of the Federal Trade Commission was reduced by 40% and the staff at FTC Regional Offices
was severely cut. Id. The staff of the FTC Regional Office in New York was reduced from
93 to 12. Id.
240 See Constantine, supra note 239.
241 See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, supra note 51.
242 An important example is Hartford Fire Insurance v. Cal., supra note 101, in which
attorneys general of nineteen states sued several of the major domestic insurance companies,
as well as domestic and foreign re-insurers, most notably Lloyds of London, and insurance
brokers alleging an international conspiracy between the companies.
243 See Himes, supra note 50, at 6.
244 In October 2004, Organon USA Inc. settled multistate claims that it tried to keep
generic competition for the drug Remeron off of the market. Organon was ordered to pay
$36 million to consumers, states and third parties. Settlement Offered in Drug Patent Case,
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at C2. State attorneys general also brought suit against the
manufacturers of children's Motrin. Press Release, Oregon Department of Justice, AG
Announces Settlement with 2 Drug Manufacturers of Generic Children's Motrin (Aug. 12,
2004), http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2004/rel081304.shtml. Other recent multistate
enforcement actions against pharmaceutical companies include the Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litigation, also referred to as New York v. Aventis, see In Re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litigation, 391 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2004), in which all fifty states, D.C. and Puerto Rico
challenged restraints of trade for Cardizem and generic equivalents, gaining an $80 million
settlement. In the Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, the states recovered $100 million to
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B. Possible Federalism-Related Objections to Concurrent Antitrust
Enforcement
Critics of state level involvement in areas considered to be related to
national and international commerce generally raise three federalism-related
objections to such involvement. The first involves the doctrine of federal
supremacy and federal preemption. The second objection rests on the
Dormant Commerce Clause, and the third objection relates to the doctrine
of foreign affairs preemption.
1. Federal Preemption
The first possible objection is based on the doctrine of federal
supremacy and federal preemption. In 1787, the Founders' constitutional
design specified that the national government was one of limited, delegated
powers. On the other hand, the states' possession of full police powers
meant that states had authority to enact any type of law that the text of the
Constitution did not expressly deny to the states.24 5  The Constitution's
Supremacy Clause, however, stated that federal law is the "supreme law of
the land" and would supersede any conflicting state law on the same
subject.246  In interpreting the relationship between federal and state law
under the Supremacy Clause, courts developed the doctrine of federal
preemption. This doctrine holds that a state law that conflicts with a federal
statute or treaty is invalid when the federal statute expresses intent to
preempt the state law, when the federal statute completely occupies the
field, or when the state statute obstructs a federal statute from achieving its
purpose.2 47 Under the preemption doctrine, then, any state law that
conflicts with a federal statute regulating commerce would be preempted if
a court found a Congressional intent to do so.
2. Dormant Commerce Clause
A second possible objection is the Dormant Commerce Clause. This
reimburse consumers and government agencies in their settlement of a suit for the
company's anticompetitive maintenance of a monopoly on the drug. See In Re Buspirone
Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In a settlement involving Ohio v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 1:02-cv-01080 (EGS) (D.D.C. Nov. 2003), state officials
recovered a $555 million in settlement of the states claims that Bristol-Myers fraudulently
obtained an anti-cancer drug patent for the purpose of delaying the development of generic
alternatives to its cancer drug. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, STATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 847 (2005).
245 Hodas, supra note 230, at 65. Thus, states could not enact expostfacto laws or bills of
attainder, pass laws affirmatively regulating interstate or foreign trade, or enter into state
treaties with other countries. Id. At that time, the word "commerce" as used in the
Commerce Clause referred to trade or sales of merchandise, rather than other business
activities such as manufacturing.
246 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl 2.
247 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
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judicially-created federalism limit on state power operates to invalidate an
otherwise valid state law that presumably violates the will of Congress by
discriminating against interstate commerce or that unduly burdens interstate
commerce. 248  This doctrine has been used to invalidate state economic
legislation that courts have deemed to unduly favor economic actors within
the state vis-a-vis economic actors located outside the state. The argument
against concurrent enforcement based on this doctrine asserts that when
state prosecutors exercise their discretion to enforce federal antitrust laws
against out-of-state actors, they have incentives similar to those of state
legislators to favor in-state business interests over out-of-state or
international business interests. Indeed, some commentators have argued
that because state attorneys general are elected officials, they are likely to
be unduly influenced by dominant state business interests in their
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.
3. Foreign Affairs Preemption
Some have argued that a third potential federalism limit on concurrent
antitrust enforcement, an emerging doctrine known as "foreign policy
preemption" or "dormant foreign policy preemption," may limit state
enforcement actions with international implications.2 4 9  The doctrine of
"foreign policy preemption" holds that the power to conduct foreign affairs
is fundamentally an executive power to be wielded by the President, and
that this power should not be interfered with by state actions.250
Significantly, however, each of these doctrines was designed to deal with
the problem of state statutes that conflict with either the intent of Congress
or the will of the national Executive Branch in areas allocated to them by
the Constitution. The three doctrines have no application to situations in
which there is no conflicting state statute.
C. Answers to Objections
It should be noted that each of the three objections to concurrent state
enforcement raised by critics involve doctrines designed to deal with the
problem of state statutes that directly conflict with either the policy of
Congress as embodied in a federal statute or with the exercise of power by
the executive branch in an area in which it has express authority to act.
Thus, none of the three doctrines were designed to apply in the absence of a
248 See generally Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause
and the Constitutional Balance of Freedom, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569 (1987) (explaining the
history and effect of the Dormant Commerce Clause while calling for its demise).
249 See generally Michael D. Ramsay, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The
Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999)
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state statute that has been deemed to conflict with a matter involving a
national policy. Because concurrent enforcement of federal antitrust
involves no conflicting state statute, these doctrines are only applicable by
analogy.
1. The Inapplicability of the Doctrine ofForeign Affairs Preemption
The doctrine of foreign affairs preemption refers to a judicially
constructed doctrine designed to protect the authority of the national
government to conduct relations with other nations without undue
interference from state legislatures.25 1 It is based on the concept that the
actions of state governments could negatively affect the ability of the
national government to conduct foreign affairs and necessarily presumes
that the nation is better off when the United States speaks with one voice in
foreign affairs.2 52 The Supreme Court articulated this concern in Zschernig
v. Miller, when it stated that state and local laws are unconstitutional if they
"impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy." 253 However,
for the doctrine of foreign affairs preemption to apply, one must assert that
a state legislative enactment arguably conflicts with an aspect of national
foreign policy. In the case of concurrent enforcement of federal antitrust
laws, no state measure exists to be preempted.25 4
A second reason that the doctrine does not apply is that any national
policy involving antitrust enforcement, whether international or domestic,
falls within the Congress's authority to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce, rather than within the sphere of "foreign affairs," an area
considered to fall within the purview of the Executive Branch. It makes no
sense to think of a statute expressing a congressional preference for
concurrent state involvement in enforcing federal antitrust law, such as the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, being "preempted" due to a conflict with national
policy, when the Act itself is a valid reflection of national policy. 25 5 In fact,
state involvement in international antitrust enforcement under powers
251 See generally Resnik, supra note 228 (giving an overview of foreign affairs
preemption).
252 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("The
nature of transactions with foreign nations ... requires caution and unity of design, and their
success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.") (quoting U.S. Senate Reports,
Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, p. 24).
253 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
254 In the case of a possible dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine, a federal statute
may not be necessary, but the need for a state legislative act to be preempted remains.
255 See Peter J. Spiro, Contextual Determinism and Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 363, 365 (2001) (arguing that it makes no sense for a court to allow the Executive
Branch to preempt state activities in an area that has been specifically allocated to
Congress's jurisdiction, especially in the case where the state involvement has not only not
been preempted by Congress, but where Congress itself has encouraged the states to get
involved in the area).
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granted to the States by Congress under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Actshould
rarely, if ever, be a candidate for dormant foreign affairs preemption based
on Executive Branch policy preferences, since the regulation of interstate
and foreign commerce is an area allocated to Congress. 56
A larger problem with the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs
preemption is that globalization has blurred the line not only between what
is national and what is local, but also between the foreign and the domestic.
If it is true that all local acts now have global implications,2 57 then an
expansive view of the doctrine of foreign affairs preemption now means
that nearly all state action should be restricted. The effect of this on
traditional notions of federalism has led Professor Peter Spiro to advocate
that states be allowed to act relatively freely in areas with international
implications and that courts should invalidate on a casebycase basis only
those few state activities with detrimental effects on national foreign
relations.2 58
Spiro also argues that in the 21st century, state actions are less likely
than in the past to interfere with the nation's conduct of foreign policy. 219
According to Spiro "the crucial switch is found in notions of international
responsibility. In the past, national governments were, as a matter of law
and practice, held responsible for the misdeeds of subnational
authorities." 260 Today, international actors better understand the internal
workings of other nations and in particular they understand that when
dealing with the United States, state actions do not represent U.S. foreign
policy. Today, foreign nations not only realize this, they are able to
exercise influence over state actions by threatening to restrict their
investment in or commerce with a particular offending state. In this
situation, Spiro argues that "subnational activity no longer poses a risk of
interfering with national policy, and there is no need to depart from the
federalism construct that governs other areas of reulation" when
considering state activities with international implications.2
2. Why Dormant Commerce Clause Related Concerns are Misplaced
The Dormant Commerce Clause has been applied by the Supreme
Court to invalidate state economic protectionist legislation that
discriminates against or unduly burdens the commercial activities of out-of-
256 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 ("[The Congress shall have the power] [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
257 See Spiro, supra note 255, at 365.
258 Id. at 366-67; see also Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 1223, 1255-58 (1999) (asserting that courts have demonstrated an institutional
competency in determining whether state measures interfere with foreign relations).
259 See Spiro, supra note 255, at 367.
260 id.
261 Id. at 368.
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state businesses, including international firms. Posner's concerns about
"protectionist" state enforcement of federal antitrust law seems to fall
within the category of Dormant-Commerce-Clause-related concerns. It
does not apply directly to the issues involved in concurrent antitrust
enforcement because when state attorneys general enforce federal antitrust
law, no discriminatory state legislation is involved. Advocates of Posner's
position, however, could argue that the rationale for the Dormant
Commerce Clause applies equally well to the exercise of discretion by state
prosecutors when it is used to favor in-state businesses at the expense of
out-of-state firms.262
Posner claims that because state attorneys general hold elected office,
they have incentives to sue business firms that are competitors of businesses
resident within their states, "including corporations that have headquarters
or extensive operations in the state."263 He does not argue that state
attorneys general are likely to openly champion the cause of in-state
business, presumably because the H-S-R Act authorizes states to bring suit
only on behalf of individuals and pecifically denies them the power to sue
on behalf of business entities.2 Rather, Posner argues that in-state
businesses will covertly exert influence on state officials in order to
persuade them to exercise their prosecutorial discretion in a way that favors
local businesses and burdens out-of-state competitors.265 There appears to
be little empirical support for this view and none has been provided by the
advocates of this position. Posner's view of the suitability of State
attorneys General as antitrust enforcers is directly contrary to the view
expressed in the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. After
stating that the additional antitrust enforcement powers granted to State
attorneys general would provide an additional method of enforcement to
persons suffering actual antitrust harm who would otherwise go
uncompensated, the House Report expressed the view that a state attorney
general is "an effective and ideal spokesman for the public in antitrust
cases." The reasons cited included that a state attorney general is "normally
an elected, accountable and responsible public officer whose duty is to
promote the public interest."266
Patricia Conners, the head of the NAAG Multistate Task Force,
however, has described the criteria that generally dictate whether a state or
states will choose to pursue an antitrust matter. These criteria bear little
resemblance to the concerns that Posner posits may motive state antitrust
actions. The criteria she lists are as follows: "(1) Does the matter have a
local or regional impact upon the state's consumers or economy?; (2) Does
262 See Posner, New Economy, supra note 30; Posner, Federalism, supra note 60.
263 See Posner, Federalism, supra note 59, at 8-10.
264 id
265 id.
266 H.R. Rep. No. 94-499(I) pt.3.
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the matter affect the public interest?; (3) Are state or local governmental
agencies impacted?; (4) Can consumers directly or indirectly benefit from
state enforcement regarding this matter?; (5) Is the matter already being
adequately addressed by the federal agencies or private plaintiffs? If so, has
adequate injunctive relief been obtained?; (6) Is it the right thing to do?"2 67
Several current or former members of the staffs of state attorneys
general also have provided evidence to refute Posner's claim. For example,
a former New York Antitrust Bureau Chief noted that the New York
Attorney General's office filed an amicus curiae brief in the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2004 takin8g a position adverse to Verizon, one of New York's
largest employers.26  He also noted that the decision by the New York
Attorney General to settle the Microsoft case was not in the economic
269interest of IBM, one of the state's leading corporate citizens.
Even if state officials had an incentive to file antitrust suits for the
purpose of giving a competitive advantage to business entities located
within their state, such a strategy would not be effective due to the role of
the federal judiciary in antitrust enforcement. As one AMC member stated:
"It is important to remember that multiple enforcement itself is subject to a
critical check and balance: the federal courts."270 He noted that ever27
aspect of non-merger antitrust enforcement requires judicial intervention.
The result of this is that "notwithstanding multiple enforcers of the antitrust
laws, only the courts can determine whether a violation of law has been
established. Having multiple enforcers simply provides greater assurance
that the courts have that chance." 2 72
D. Concurrent Enforcement Promotes the Values Underlying the Federal
System
1. Concurrent Enforcement ofAntitrust Promotes Robust Debate on
Issues ofPublic Policy
Rather than raise constitutional concerns, concurrent enforcement of
antitrust is instead in harmony with basic principles of federalism,
especially with federalism's role in promoting robust debate over issues of
public policy. The functions of the NAAG Antitrust Task Force, for
267 Patricia A. Conners, Current Trends and Issues in State Antitrust Enforcement, 16
Lov. CONSUMER L. REv. 37, 58 (2003).
268 See Himes, supra note 50.
269 Id.
270 Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendation: Separate
Statements of Commissioners Burchfield, Delrahim, Jacobson, Kempf Litvack, Valentine,




272 Id. at 415.
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example, reveal the desire of state officials to take part in the policy debate
over ways to improve antitrust enforcement for the benefit of consumers.
In addition to its function as a way to coordinate the multistate litigation
process, a major purpose of the Antitrust Task Force is to participate in the
formulation of antitrust policy initiatives. Indeed three of its four major
listed functions relate to this goal. They are: "to facilitate the state attorneys
general participation as amicus curiae in antitrust matters where
appropriate"; "to suggest or comment upon legislation for Congress and
state legislatures"; and "to develop policy positions on antitrust issues."273
An important illustration of the way in which state enforcement has
sparked debate on controversial issues of antitrust enforcement is provided
by the debate over the harmfulness of vertical restraints. Former New York
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust and one-time senior advisor to
Eliot Spitzer, Lloyd Constantine has described how, during the Reagan
Administration, federal agencies were engaged in what he terms an "all out
assault on the application of antitrust law to all vertical restraints of
trade." 274 When the issue of the per se illegality of vertical restraints came
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite, the Reagan
administration filed an amicus brief against their continued prohibition
while the states collectively filed an amicus brief taking the opposite
position.2 75 The Supreme Court agreed with the states' position and refused
to overrule a leading case on vertical restraints, Dr. Miles Medical Co. 27 6 In
January 1985, however, the Antitrust Division issued its Vertical Restraints
Guidelines, which indicated that the Division would not prosecute many
forms of vertical restraint.277 In response to this federal action, the NAAG
Task Force on Antitrust issued its own Vertical Restraints Guidelines which
278indicated that the states would continue to prosecute vertical restraints.
In relating this history, Constantine remarked that "[w]hen the States joined
together in that non-partisan effort we bucked the conventional knock on
the States, which said that because of negative 'collective action' principals
the State could not and would not foster the greater good for the nation and
instead would engage in a race to the bottom."27 9
One commentator summed up the role of concurrent enforcement in
fostering debate over antitrust policy this way:
273 Conners, supra note 266, at 56.
274 Constantine, supra note 239, at 4.
275 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
276 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Dr. Miles
was overruled in part in 2007 by Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007).
277 Donald L. Flexner & Mark A. Racanelli, Merger Control and State Aids Panel: State
and Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the United States: Collision or Harmony?, 9 CoNN. J.
INT'L L. 501 (1994).
278 See Constantine, supra note 239.
279 Id. at 7.
333
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:285 (2010)
Federalism serves antitrust jurisprudence, society, and democracy by
giving voice to the diversity of opinion and by allowing the states to
find ways to serve their citizens' varying (and, at times, conflicting)
concerns . . . . Federalism allows for the experimentation, the
successes, and the failures needed to find the best approach for a
given time and a given market. It reminds legislators, courts, and
scholars that, on many key issues, reasonable minds may differ and
that, because society has conflicting and overlapping desires, there
may not be one single answer.280
2. Antitrust Laws Play an Important Role in Safeguarding the Public,
Health, Safety, and Welfare
Given the Supreme Court's current broad interpretation of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, limiting state attorneys general to
prosecution of "local" or "intrastate" commerce would leave state officials
with an extraordinarily limited scope of authority.281 As cases such as
Wickard v. Filburn282 and Gonzalez v. Raich283 make clear, Congress may
regulate even local economic conduct that has more than a tangential effect
on interstate commerce.
In Hartford Fire Insurance, the attorneys general of nineteen states
sued several of the major domestic insurers, domestic and foreign re-
insurers, and insurance brokers after the DOJ declined a request by the state
attorneys general to investigate an alleged conspiracy between the
companies to boycott general liability insurers and force those insurers to
conform the terms of their domestic commercial general liability policies to
the forms used by defendants.284 The alleged boycott had an adverse impact
upon municipalities because it effectively foreclosed cities and counties
from obtaining commercial general liability insurance terms.285 In this
instance the British authorities did not in fact regulate the alleged
anticompetitive activity, and there was little benefit to deferring to their
regulatory choices in this area, since many nations, including the United
States, are less diligent in enforcing their competition laws when the injured
consumers reside outside their boundaries.286
280 Jean Wegman Bums, Embracing Both Faces ofAntirust Federalism: Parker and ARC
America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 29,43,44 (2000).
281 ABA Comments, supra note 63, at 12.
282 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
283 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
284 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770, 784-90 (1993).
285 id.
286 Id. at 799.
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E. Impossibility of Separating the "Truly National" from the "Truly
Local" in Antitrust Cases
The problems of separating local from national issues discussed above
apply with particular force to the types of consumer welfare issues
addressed by the antitrust laws. Even a cursory examination of the ways in
which state attorneys general have exercised their parens patriae authority
makes clear that limiting state officials to prosecuting only completely local
competitive restraints would seriously interfere with their ability to operate
as guardians of the public, health, safety, and welfare of their residents. A
good illustration of this can be seen in the Hartford Fire Insurance case
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993.287 The regulation of insurance
is an area of particular concern for state regulators and is acknowledged to
be a special area of "traditional state concern." 288 In fact, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act specifically declares that state regulation of insurance is in the
public interest. * In Hartford Fire, a group of state attorneys general
became aware of an international antitrust conspiracy that they believed was
making it impossible for both state agencies and state residents to obtain
necessary property and casualty insurance. 2 90  This case graphically
illustrates the way in which even an international conspiracy can have very
immediate effects on both state governments and on the vital interests of
state residents.29 '
A second illustration is provided by a number of cases brought by state
attorneys general acting together through the NAAG Antitrust Task Force
in industries such as pharmaceuticals, health care and
telecommunications-all areas of intense local concern with national
implications.29 2 According to Patricia Conners, state antitrust officials
have focused more attention on the health care industry than any other
industry.293 She explains the reason for this as being "health care markets
are typically local in nature and therefore more likely to draw the attention
of state attorneys general. Of course, the increasingly high costs of health
care, health insurance, and pharmaceuticals also make it a prime issue of
concern for state attorneys general acting on behalf of consumers."2 94
Another particular state concern in the health care industry concerns tying
287 509 U.S. 764.
288 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000).
289 id.
290 509 U.S. at 770, 784-90.
291 See Insurance Companies Settle Multistate Conspiracy Charges, 67 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. 434 (Oct. 13, 1994).
292 See Conners, supra note 266, at 46 ("Over the last five years in particular, state
attorneys general have also made challenging abuses within the pharmaceuticals industry a
primary enforcement initiative. Since January 2003, state attorneys general have announced
three major settlements with pharmaceutical companies, totaling $235 million.").
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and bundling the sale of pharmaceuticals to state agencies and to state
employee health plans.295
F. Dangers of Under-enforcement in Antitrust
In general, when a statute is designed to prevent covert business
conduct, there is a serious problem with detection of the conduct. For this
reason, the punishments for statutory violations are often designed to have
an in terrorem effect. Good examples of this phenomenon are the stiff
penalties levied for the violation of insider trading rules or for violation of
rules concerning obstruction of justice, such as shredding documents.296
Concurrent enforcement of federal antitrust laws prevents potentially
harmful under-enforcement of prohibitions on conduct harmful to
consumers by allowing states to pursue federal antitrust claims
notwithstanding a decision by federal authorities not to act.297 A benefit of
concurrent state and federal antitrust laws is that it promotes a consistent
U.S. antitrust policy by insulating antitrust policy decisions from the
political pressures to which it is inevitably subject. 29 An AMC
Commissioner stated that,
If antitrust is a priority of a presidential administration, we can be
confident of appointees to the Justice Department and Federal Trade
Commission who will pursue robust enforcement. But, as we have
seen at times over the past 30 years, antitrust is not always an
Executive Branch priority. In some instances, the Executive Branch
may seek to curtail antitrust significantly, or more commonly, to sit
on the sidelines while cases are not brought. In any given case, the
federal enforcement agencies may elect not to proceed, but injured
parties and the states have the ability to fill the gap.299
In addition, in cases where both the states and federal authorities bring
suit, states possess the power to seek relief beyond that sought by federal
authorities. o Some have argued that this dual authority presents the
295 Kathleen E. Foote, State Antitrust Enforcement, 2009 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
PLI Order No. 18840, May-June 2009, at 750.
296 Many of the concerns expressed about the danger of over-regulation in regard to
concurrent enforcement are concerns about duplicative state and federal review of proposed
mergers, which is not within the scope the issues considered in this article.
297 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
298 See Statement of Jacobsen, supra note 269, at 415 ("Multiple enforcement ensures
that the administration of the antitrust laws will be not only vigorous, but insulated, to a
degree from the vagaries of the electoral process.").
299 id.
3 See, e.g., New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002) (states
pursued remedies following DOJ settlement); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised
Price Antitrust Litigation, 216 F.R.D. 197 (D. Me. 2003) (states pursued remedies following
FTC settlement).
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potential for unfairness because it subjects businesses to "multiple
remedies."301 This argument, however, ignores the fact that when multiple
plaintiffs are able to prove that each has suffered independent antitrust
injury from the same actions, each is entitled to a recovery. 02 Not allowing
parties to antitrust cases to sue for different remedies when those parties
represent the interests of different victims harmed by the anticompetitive
activities is a recipe for under-enforcement of the antitrust laws and for
unjust enrichment for antitrust defendants. For example, the fact that a
particular defendant must pay compensation to a particular private plaintiff
for injury suffered by a conspiracy does not preclude other injured parties
from also suing for treble damages.303 In fact, the legislative history of the
H-S-R Act makes clear that granting state attorneys general the right to sue
on consumers' behalf would not unfairly increase any defendant's liability,
but merely provide another avenue of enforcement to victims of antitrust
conspiracies who would otherwise not be compensated for their injury.30
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that antitrust suits brought by different
inured parties are "designated to be cumulative, not mutually exclusive . .
In fact, Professor Stephen Calkins has argued persuasively that even in
the Microsoft case, a case often cited to illustrate the disadvantages of state
involvement in prosecution of conduct that is the subject of simultaneous
federal prosecution, the participation of state enforcement authorities was
beneficial because state officials represented injured parties who would
otherwise not have had their injuries addressed by the relief proposed by
federal authorities.306
As proponents of concurrent state antitrust enforcement have pointed
out, the practical costs imposed on businesses of dual enforcement have at
times been exaggerated. An AMC Commissioner stated that,
The record before the Commission demonstrates convincingly, in my
view, that the states can effectively supplement the federal agencies
in bringing important cases; and by their very presence, provide an
important check against federal under-enforcement . . . . The
Commission was presented with no evidence demonstrating that
state enforcement has resulted in harmful inconsistencies in legal
obligations, deterrence of precompetitive conduct or excessive
costs.307
301 Posner, New Economy, supra note 30.
302 See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I).
303 See H.R. REP. No. 94-499(I) pt. 4.
3 See id
305 United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518, 519 (1954) (quoting United States v.
Bendix Home Appliances, 10 F.R.D. 73, 77 (S.N.D.Y. 1949)).
306 See, Calkins, supra note 92, at 675.
307 See Statement ofJacobsen, supra note 269, at 415.
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CONCLUSION
If the decades of the 1980s and 1990s are remembered as the "Era of
Deregulation," it now looks as though the early decades of the 21st Century
may be remembered as the "Era of Rethinking Regulation for a Global
Economy." A key issue for the United States in the coming years will be
deciding what sort of federal system works best in a world where business
increasingly takes place in international markets. In particular, what role
should state officials play in this new economic order? I am inclined to
agree with Professor Cristina Rodriguez, who has written that:
"Counterintuitively, the changes wrought by international economic
integration demand strong institutions beneath the national level."3 08 As the
foregoing analysis indicates, considering the debate over the desirability of
concurrent state and federal enforcement of the federal antitrust laws in
light of contemporary scholarship on federalism reveals that a regime
combining national and state enforcement in antitrust has been a success
and provides a model for effective economic regulation in a global world.
308 Rodriguez, supra note 125.
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